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DESIGN AND RAMS ANALYSIS OF RAILWAY INTERLOCKING BASED 
ON FORMAL METHODS: AN EXAMPLE APPLICATION 
SUMMARY 
In this thesis study, design and implementation of an example railway interlocking 
mechanism with formal methods is aimed. German “Ks” signal system is considered 
as the signalling principle for designed simple interlocking. However, all features of 
the Ks system are not considered for the purpose of simplification of the study. All 
basic terms and equipment used in railway signalling are defined in the first chapter. 
Then, the features of “Ks” signalling system and Turkish signalling system are 
explained in detail. 
In the third chapter, definition of the interlocking is given and the functionality of the 
interlocking in railways is explained. Most of the definitions in third chapter are 
excerpted from reference number 2. 
In the fourth chapter, formal methods that are also used for designing interlocking 
system are explained. Then, two widely used formal methods, “Petri Nets” and “Finite 
State Machines” are discussed. Model of a simple turnstile device is given as an 
example to show design steps of finite state machines method. Afterwards, two 
different implementation software are examined with advantages and disadvantages. 
In the end of the chapter, implementation of example given before is achieved with 
both programming tools. 
In fifth chapter, a model railway station is created. All types operational specifications 
and characteristics are defined for the model station that includes train types, line types 
and others. Then, positioning of the signalling equipment on the model station is 
discussed.  
In “Example Interlocking Design” part, the route table of the model station is generated 
and a route setting mechanism is designed with using finite state machines method. 
Firstly, control unit of all wayside equipment are modelled and implemented. 
Afterwards, some basic route setting functions according to route setting rules are 
modelled with the same method. Finally, the route setting mechanism for the first route 
defined in the route table is created with developed models. Then, it is implemented 
with PLC programming software, SilworX, and tested with the same software. 
The RAMS analyses are presented in chapter 7. Basic definitions of RAMS are 
explained and two mostly used methods in RAMS analysis, “Fault Tree Analysis” and 
“Markov Model” are explained with detailed examples. Finally, a Markov model is 
created for the model station which is designed in fifth chapter and equations used for 
RAMS calculations are obtained. The RAMS parameters are estimated. 
Final chapter presents results and conclusion of the thesis work. Designed example 
interlocking and the future works are discussed in this chapter.  
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DEMİRYOLU ANKLAŞMAN SİSTEMLERİNİN FORMAL YÖNTEMLER 
İLE DİZAYNI VE RAMS ANALİZİ: ÖRNEK UYGULAMA 
ÖZET 
Demiryolu sinyalizasyon sistemleri trenlerin güvenli, planlı ve ekonomik bir şekilde 
işletilmesini sağlayan sistemlerdir.  
Geleneksel demiryolu araçları raylar üzerinde çelik ray – çelik tekerlek yöntemi ile yol 
alırlar. Bu yöntem sayesinde çelik ray ile çelik tekerlek arasındaki sürtünme kuvveti 
azaltılarak yuvarlanma direnci düşürülmüş olur. Böylelikle trenlerin hareket etmesi 
için harcanan enerjiden tasarruf edilmiş olur. Fakat bu durum başka bir problemi de 
beraberinde getirir; Frenleme problemi. Raylar ve tekerlekler arasındaki düşük 
sürtünme kuvveti fren mesafesinin, makinistlerin görüş mesafesinden daha uzun 
olmasına neden olur. Bu nedenle trenlerin duruş noktalarından belirli bir mesafe 
öncesinde fren uygulamaları gerekmektedir. Demiryolu sinyalizasyon sistemlerinin 
temel amaçlarından biriside fren mesafesini hesaba katarak trenlerin hareket 
güvenliğini sağlamaktır. 
Demiryollarında çeşitli amaçlarla çeşitli cihazlar kullanılır. Örneğin makaslar rayların 
bağlantısını değiştirerek trenlerin bir raydan başka bir raya geçmesi için kullanılır. 
Trenler gitmesi gereken güzergâhlarda ilerlerken çok sayıda makasın üzerinden 
geçerler ve tüm bu makasların güzergâha uygun pozisyona ayarlanmış olması gerekir. 
Sinyalizasyon sistemleri makas gibi demiryolu cihazların güvenlik kriterleri 
çerçevesinde otomatik olarak kontrol eder ve güvenliliği garanti eder. Sistemde bu gibi 
saha ekipmanlarının kontrolü ve güvenli pozisyonda kilitlenmesi işlevleri yerine 
getiren mekanizma “Anklaşman” olarak adlandırılır. 
Anklaşman sistemleri, trenlerin güvenli hareket edebilmesi için demiryollarında 
kullanılan saha ekipmanlarının uygun ve güvenli durumda kilitlenmesini sağlayan 
sinyalizasyon sistemlerinin temel bileşenidir. Bu tez çalışmasında örnek bir demiryolu 
anklaşman mekanizmasının formal yöntemler ile tasarlanması ve uygulanması 
amaçlanmıştır. Tasarlanan basit anklaşman sistemi için dizayn kriteri olarak Alman 
“Ks” sinyal sistemi dikkate alınmıştır. Fakat çalışmayı basitleştirmek amacı ile Ks 
sisteminin tüm özellikleri kapsanmamıştır.  
Birinci bölümde genel manada sinyalizasyon sisteminin ve güvenlik kriterlerinin 
demiryollarındaki önemi istatistiki bilgilerle anlatılmıştır. 
İkinci bölümde, demiryolu sinyalizasyon sistemlerinin yapısı ve bu sistemlere neden 
ihtiyaç duyulduğu açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra sinyalizasyon sistemlerinde kullanılan 
temel bileşenler ve makas, sinyal lambası, aks sayıcı, vs. gibi temel saha ekipmanları 
açıklanmıştır. 
Farklı ülkeler farklı sinyalizasyon prensiplerine sahiptir. İkinci bölümün devamında 
Alman Ks sinyal sisteminde ve Türk sinyal sisteminde kullanılan sinyalizasyon 
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prensipleri tanımlanmıştır. Her iki sistemde kullanılan sinyal lambaları kullanım 
yerleri ve anlamları ile açıklanmıştır. 
Üçüncü bölümde anklaşman terimi açıklandıktan sonra demiryollarındaki karşılığı 
anlatılmıştır. İlk kullanılan mekanik sistemlerinden günümüzde kullanılan bilgisayar 
tabanlı modern sistemlere kadar kullanılan farklı yapılardaki anklaşman sistemleri 
üçüncü bölümde işlenmiştir. 
Sinyalizasyon sistemlerinde oluşabilecek her hangi bir hata, trenlerin raydan çıkması 
veya başka trenler ile çarpışması gibi ölümcül sonuçlar doğuracak ciddi tren kazalarına 
sebep olabilir. Bu nedenle sinyalizasyon sistemleri tasarlanırken sistemin çalışması 
esnasında oluşabilecek tüm arızalar düşünülerek bu gibi arıza durumlarında sistemin 
güvenli duruma geçmesi sağlanır. Hatada güvenlilik şeklinde tanımlanan bu prensip 
üçüncü bölümde örneklerle açıklanmıştır. 
Anklaşman sistemleri tasarlanırken bir takım temel prensipler dikkate alınır. Üçüncü 
bölümde bu tasarım prensiplerinden bir kısmı, 2 numaralı kaynaktan faydalanılarak 
açıklanmıştır. 
Dördüncü bölümde anklaşman sistemlerinin tasarlanmasında kullanılan formal 
yöntemler açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra yaygın olarak kullanılan iki yöntem “Petri 
Ağları” ve “Sonlu Durum Makinaları” tartışılmıştır. Sonlu durum makinaları 
yönteminin tasarım basamaklarını göstermek amacı ile basit bir turnike cihazının 
modellenmesi örnek olarak verilmiştir.  
Dördüncü bölümün devamında, tasarlanacak modelleri gerçeklemek ve test etmek için 
iki farklı PLC programlama yazılımı avantaj ve dezavantajları ile incelenmiştir. 
Ardından, daha önce verilen basit örnek model her iki programlama yazılımıyla da 
gerçeklenmiştir. İleriki bölümlerde tasarlanacak modeller için kullanılacak olan 
SilworX yazılımının neden tercih edildiği aynı bölümün sonunda açıklanmıştır. 
Beşinci bölümde bir model demiryolu istasyonu tasarlanmıştır. Tasarlanan model 
istasyon için hat tipleri ve tren tipleri ve tüm işletme karakteristikleri tanımlanmıştır. 
Daha sonra sinyalizasyon ekipmanlarının konumlandırılması tartışılmıştır. 
Altıncı bölümde model istasyon için olası tüm tren güzergâhlarını gösteren bir 
güzergâh tablosu oluşturulmuştur. Bu tablo anklaşman tasarlanan bölgedeki 
güzergâhların hangi saha ekipmanlarını kullandığı ve bu saha ekipmanlarının 
durumunun ne olması gerektiğini gösterir. 
Altıncı bölümün devamında sonlu durum makinaları yöntemi kullanılarak ikinci 
bölümde açıklanan hat boyu ekipmanlarının modelleri oluşturulmuş ve PLC 
programlama yazılımı SilworX ile gerçeklenmiştir. Daha sonra aynı yöntemle 
güzergâh tablosu dikkate alınarak bazı güzergah tayin etme fonksiyonları 
modellenmiştir. Son olarak tasarlanan modeller ile güzergah tablosundaki ilk güzergah 
için tayin etme mekanizması oluşturulmuştur. Daha sonra bu mekanizma SilworX 
yazılımı ile gerçeklenmiş ve test edilmiştir. 
Bölüm 7’de sistem tasarımında dikkat edilmesi gereken “Güvenilirlik, Emre amadelik, 
Sürdürülebilirlik ve Güvenlik” kriterleri işlenmiştir. RAMS kriterleri olarak ifade 
edilen bu kriterlerin hesaplanması ve analizinde yaygın olarak kullanılan iki adet 
yöntem “Hata Ağacı Yöntemi” ve “Markov Modeli”  aynı bölümde açıklanmıştır. Son 
olarak beşinci bölümde oluşturulan model istasyon için bir Markov modeli tasarlanmış 
ve bu model ile RAMS analizinde kullanılan denklemler elde edilmiştir. Bu bölümün 
sonunda RAMS parametreleri elde edilmiştir. 
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Tez çalışmasında ulaşılan sonuçlar son bölümde gösterilmiştir. Ayrıca bu bölümde 
tasarlanan anklaşman sistemi ve gelecekte yapılabilecekler tartışılmıştır. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Railway transportation is a major form of passenger and freight transport in many 
countries. People prefer rail transport for their daily journeys and intercity travels. Due 
to the fact that the rail transportation is safe, fast, easily reachable and comfortable. [2] 
Despite of high safety, fatal accidents are still occurring in modern railways [3]. For 
example, in 2011, there were 2325 persons killed or seriously injured in railway 
accidents in Europe [4]. Table 1.1 shows the number of persons killed and injured by 
those accidents in 2011 [4]. 
Table 1.1 : Number of persons killed and injured by type of accident in Europa [4] 
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Collisions 9 3 3 15 33 11 5 49 42 14 8 64 
Derailments 2 2 0 4 43 2 0 45 45 4 0 49 
Accidents 
involving 
level crossing 6 0 311 317 24 14 291 329 30 14 602 646 
Accidents to 
persons 
caused 
by rolling 
stock in 
motion 22 25 856 903 123 36 453 612 145 61 
130
9 
151
5 
Fires in 
rolling stock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 0 1 2 3 6 20 22 48 6 21 24 51 
Total 39 31 
117
2 
124
2 229 83 771 
108
3 268 114 
194
3 
232
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Signalling systems play the most important role in railway safety. Main purpose of the 
signalling systems is to prevent derailments and collusions between trains. The second 
objective is to manage the railway traffic and increase the operation capacity.  
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In railways, several equipment and devices, also called “wayside” or “lineside” 
equipment, are used for different purposes. All this equipment and devices have to be 
proper position before permitting a train movement to ensure a safe operation. 
Signalling system guarantees the safety with locking wayside equipment with each 
other. This internal locking activity is called “interlocking”.  
Furthermore, a failure in the signalling systems can cause serious consequences and 
any dangerous failure is unacceptable. Whereas, any device or equipment cannot be 
fully reliable in the real world. For that reason, almost every equipment and devices 
are produced with respect to fail-safe criteria in railway signalling systems. Fail-safe 
is a design criteria used to design a device, which may cause some dangerous 
consequences in the system when it fails. A Fail-safe device guarantees to be system 
in safe state when a failure in system occurs. Therefore, the safety of the system is 
ensured. 
In modern railway signalling systems, interlocking function is provided by 
programmable electronic devices such as microprocessor, industrial computer or PLC. 
These devices are called “interlocking unit”. The software in the interlocking unit has 
to be developed with special methods to obtain high safety levels. According to the 
European Standard EN 61508, formal methods can be used to develop an interlocking 
algorithm. 
Formal methods are a kind of mathematical based design techniques for specification, 
development and verification of software systems. They play an important role in 
increasing the completeness, consistency or correctness of a specification or 
implementation because formal methods transfer the principles of mathematical 
reasoning to the specification and implementation of technical systems [5]. 
On the other hand, high safety level is not the only essential requirement of the 
signalling systems. Besides, signalling system must have a certain level of reliability, 
availability and maintainability rate. All these rates are called RAMS (reliability, 
availability, maintainability and safety) rates. RAMS is defined to indicate the quality 
and working performance of the signalling system. 
The intent of this thesis is to examine how to design and implement an example railway 
interlocking system with using formal methods. For that purpose, the general features 
and characteristics of the modern railway signalling systems will be examined in first 
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chapters of thesis. Afterwards, the formal methods will be discussed with all steps. 
Finally, an example interlocking will be designed and implemented for a model 
railway station with formal methods. German Ks system has been considered as the 
signalling principle in this study. Because, the most part of the thesis are completed in 
Germany. 
In chapter 7, two widely used methods which used to calculate RAMS parameters of 
the signalling system will be examined. Then, a simple RAMS analysis will be handled 
for the model station designed before. Application of fault tree and Markov model to 
railway risk, safety and reliability is referred to [6] and [7]. 
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2. BASICS OF RAILWAY SIGNALLING 
2.1 General Description 
Railway vehicles have some different characteristics from other land transportation 
vehicles. If it is compared with road vehicles; the mass of a train is very high, 
acceleration and deceleration rates are low and stopping distant is relatively long. A 
railway vehicle cannot stop safely when an obstacle or another vehicle seen on the 
way. A train running full speed at a curvy track can be given as an example. Because 
of the restricted visibility, driver cannot see if there is another vehicle waiting on the 
same track. Therefore, driver has to be informed in advance with a movement 
authority which guarantees there isn’t any other vehicle on the path. Railway 
signalling system gives the moving authority to driver [8]. 
On the other hand, there are several equipment and devices used in railways for various 
purposes such as point machine. It is also required to monitor and control these 
equipment to ensure they are in correct state and working without failure. All 
equipment and devices have to be failure-free, because any failure occurred in them 
can lead collision or derailment. Safety is the main purpose of the railway signalling 
system. 
Furthermore, signalling system also increases the operation capacity. Because it sets 
automatically the train’s path which wanted to proceed on and allows trains to travel 
at maximum speed is allowable by the characteristics of the line. Then, the number of 
journey per day can be offered more frequent and that makes possible to use railway 
line more efficiently. 
To sum up, basic functional principle of railway signalling system can be defined as; 
it monitors all vehicles on tracks, checks and sets the wayside equipment and gives to 
trains movement authority to ensure the safety and operational quality. 
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2.2 Train Control Center 
Train control center (TCC) is the monitoring and management office of a railway 
signalling system. Almost all central equipment of the signalling system are placed in 
TCC. Figure 2.1 shows a TCC. 
 
Figure 2.1: A Train control center (TCC) and Dispatcher [9] 
The person who is responsible to manage the whole railway traffic is called Dispatcher. 
Dispatcher monitors the traffic flows and gives related commands to signalling system 
to control it. The interface between signalling system and dispatcher provided by a 
computer called operator tool. This computer shows the map of whole line controlled 
by signalling system and accept signalling control commands such as; point control, 
route setting or route blocking. A sample dispatcher screen can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 : A Sample Dispatcher Screen [10] 
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2.3 Wayside Equipment 
As mentioned in the description of signalling, there are some basic lineside equipment 
for various purpose in the railways. In this chapter most using lineside equipment are 
explained. 
Signalling systems must be designed to be fail-safe. This means that the failure of any 
equipment or subsystem must result in a default state which ensures safety in all 
circumstances. Systems and equipment are therefore designed, manufactured, installed 
and maintained with safety criteria. The term of fail-safe will be explained in next 
chapters.  
2.3.1 Point machines 
Railway vehicles proceed on guided ways called track. The purpose of points is to 
provide mechanical connection between tracks. It is a movable track element and it 
makes possible to change existing track of a train with another track according to its 
position. 
Positions of a point are defined as “Normal” and “Reverse” (or “Straight” and 
“Divergent”). Normal position means the train will continue on the same track. 
Conversely, if a point in reverse position, that means the train running over it will leave 
the existing track and pass another track. The third position can be defined as 
“Intermediate” to indicate the point's condition when it is moving. It is a transition 
condition between normal and reverse position. Figure 2.3 shows the basic structure 
of a point. 
 
Figure 2.3 : A railway point [11] 
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Train movements from “A” to “B” or “A” to “C” in the figure called facing 
movements. These movements are arranged with the point position. On the other hand, 
a movement from “B” to “A” or “C” to “A” is called trailing move. If the point is in 
wrong position in a trailing move, the point blades are forced to move to correct 
position by the wheel flanges of the train. This is the trailing action of the point. Some 
type of points have a blade locking mechanism and they cannot be trailed. Therefore, 
wrong blade position of this type of points can cause a derailment. 
The movement of the point is provided by the point machine. Point machine is an 
active device for using to control the positioning of a point. There are also position 
sensors inside the point control mechanism to ensure the actual position of the point. 
These sensors detect the position of the point blades and provide a feedback to the 
signalling system continuously. 
Railway signalling system monitors and controls the point via position sensors and 
point machine. 
2.3.1.1 Simple point 
Simple point is the basic type of points. It has only two end positions: normal and 
reverse. Figure 2.4 shows a simple point. It is the most used type of point around the 
world. 
 
Figure 2.4 : A Simple Point [12] 
The trains has to obey a speed restriction when they pass over a point in reverse 
position. Because point in reverse position is a curvy path and the trains cannot proceed 
with full speed at curve. The speed restriction is one of the feature of a point. If the 
radius of a point is large, then trains can pass over it faster. Radius of the points 
determines the characteristic of the line. 
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2.3.1.2 Diamond crossing 
Diamond Crossing is used for the crossing of two tracks (Figure 2.5). It is not a 
movable track element but passing over a diamond crossing has to be controlled to 
prevent any collision. 
 
Figure 2.5 : A Diamond Crossing [12] 
2.3.1.3 Slip point 
Slip point is a combined form of diamond crossing and simple point. Two types of slip 
points are used. The first one is single slip point and the other one is double slip point. 
The differences between two types of slip point can be seen in the following Figure 
2.6 and Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.6 : A Single Slip Point. Possible paths: A->B, A->D, C->B [12] 
 
Figure 2.7 : A Double Slip Point. Possible paths: A->B, A->D, C->B, C->D [12] 
2.3.1.4 Double point 
Double point is used to split a track into three divergent paths. Its structure is more 
complicated. The only advantage of a double point is it is required small installing 
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area. Therefore, it is usually only used in a station or depot where space is restricted. 
It also called “three-way-points”. Possible paths can be seen in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8 : A Double Point. Possible paths: A->B, A->C, A->D [12] 
2.3.2 Signals 
Signals are the basic equipment provide an interface between technical devices and 
people. In railway signalling systems signals are used for conveying information from 
the system to the train driver or workers on the track. The mechanical signals called 
“Semaphore” were used in the railway signalling in the past but light signals is 
preferred now. Figure 2.9 shows the general appearance of two type signals. 
  
Figure 2.9 : Sample Railway Signals. Left: Light Signal, right: Semaphore Signal 
[13] 
Most generally conveyed information can be listed as follows: 
 Movement authority 
 Permitted speed 
 Information about the direction of the route 
 Position of points 
 Commands for brake test [railway signalling and interlocking] 
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In this study, only signals which used for movement authority and speed restriction 
are encompassed. The types of the signals will be described in the next topic. 
Considered types of signals are mostly used types but, there might be some other signal 
forms for other purposes.  
2.3.2.1 Main signal 
A main signal is a basic signal controls a train movement along a running line. These 
signals indicate if the train has to stop or is allowed to continue until the next main 
signal.  
2.3.2.2 Distant signal 
When the train driver sees that the main signal shows stop, it may not be possible to 
stop before passing it because of the long brake distance. Therefore, train driver is 
informed in advance about the next main signal’s aspect. The function of distant signal 
is fulfill these purpose. The aim of the distant signal is to enable the driver to decelerate 
in time. Almost every main signal is preceded by a distant signal. In general, it gives 
two information; “next main signal shows proceed” or “next main signal shows stop”.   
2.3.2.3 Speed restriction signal 
In some part of the railway line, trains aren’t allowed to proceed full speed. The 
geometry of the track or a point in reverse position on the path can be given as some 
reasons for speed restriction. The train driver can get the information of speed limits 
with following speed restriction signals (or speed indicators) on the wayside. Speed 
indicators are mostly located with the main signal or the distant signal. It uses the 
numbers to indicate the speed limits. If it does not indicate any number (dark), that 
means there is no speed restriction and the train can proceed with full speed. Generally, 
the last digit of the speed limit isn’t shown and it is always assumed that it is zero. For 
instance, if speed indicator shows 8, that means the speed limit is 80 km/h. 
2.3.2.4 Shunting signal 
Movement of trains in a depot or siding is very slow, so the provision of a main signal 
in that kind of area is not appropriate. In depot area or a vehicle parking area it might 
be required to do a coupling operation between coaches. Therefore, proceed aspect of 
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a shunting signal does not means the path is clear. For that reason, another color 
(usually white) is used for showing proceed in shunting signals. 
2.3.3 Track clear detection 
Location of every railway vehicles on the track has to be known by signalling system. 
Following points are the main purpose of track clear detection: 
 Before permitting a train movement track clearance has to be confirmed. 
 Switching a moveable track element when there is a vehicle over it is very 
dangerous. For a safe control of moveable track elements, system has to know 
the occupancy information on the certain area. 
Detection of the train’s location is achieved by several technics and devices. Mostly 
used technic is dividing the track to several sections and checking there is an 
occupancy in these sections. It is a discrete detection and it is provide the system there 
is an occupancy in the section. However, it is not possible to know where the train 
exactly in the section is. Track circuit and axle counter system detect the occupancy 
section by section. The technologies behind them will expressed in next section.  
2.3.3.1 Track circuits 
Today, most common ways to determine whether a track section is occupied by use of 
a track circuit. There several type of track circuits based different technics but the 
oldest and simplest type is the classical track circuits. Its working principle is based on 
short circuit principle between two rails formed by wheelset of trains in a section. 
Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 illustrate the working principle of the track circuit.  
 
Figure 2.10 : Track Circuit working principle (clear) [14]. 
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To obtain an electrically isolated section, rails divided physically and fitted an isolation 
material in the cutting point.  
It is also possible to obtain isolation between rails by electrical means without physical 
disruption of the rails. This type of track circuits called “jointless track circuit”. 
 
Figure 2.11 : Track Circuit working principle (occupied) [14]. 
2.3.3.2 Axle counters 
Another solution for occupancy detection is axle counting method. In this method 
occupied status of a block determined by using devices located at the beginning and 
end of the block that count the number of axles entering and leaving. If the same 
number of axles leave the block as enter it, the block is assumed to be clear.  The logic 
behind the working principle of axle counters is illustrated in Figure 2.12. 
Axle counters provide similar functionality to track circuits. Comparison of track 
circuits and axle counter can be seen in following Table 2.1. 
2.3.4 Derailing devices 
Derailing devices are protection equipment used against to accident caused by 
unintended movements of rail vehicles. Rail vehicles rolling uncontrolled because of 
any reason may create very dangerous situation for other rolling stocks. Therefore, 
these devices located on the track which is connecting a depot area or sidings to the 
main line. Thus, if any rolling stock runs away towards main line, it is derailed by 
these devices. 
14 
 
 
Figure 2.12 : Axle Counter working principle [1] 
Table 2.1 : Comparison of Track Circuits and Axle Counters [2] 
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2.3.4.1 Catch points 
Catch point, also called “Trap Point”, is a specific kind of the point. The mechanism 
of them are almost same but they has different functionality. Catch point is used only 
as a derailing device in some critical location. Figure 2.13 shows the trap point’s 
functionality. 
 
Figure 2.13 : Functionality of a Trap Point [15]. 
2.3.4.2 Derailer 
Derailer is a special device used for the same purpose with catch point. However, it 
has a special profile and it is mounted above onto the rail head. Derailer is also an 
active controllable device and it can be moved to upon the rail (Figure 2.14 - b) or 
aside the rail (Figure 2.14 - a) to enable or block the vehicle passing over it. 
 
Figure 2.14 : An active controlled Derailer [16]. 
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2.3.5 Level crossings 
Normally, railways are isolated from the other vehicle’s road. However, in some 
location they intersect each other. A level crossing is an intersection of a railway and 
a road. Following illustration (Figure 2.15) shows a level crossing area. Level crossing 
control is very important in railway signalling to ensure safety. 
 
Figure 2.15 : A level crossing area illustration [17]. 
Level crossing protection is the consequence of having level crossings on a railway 
line. Its aim is to avoid collisions between trains and road traffic. General protection 
principle is simple: it has to stop all road traffic before the passing of a train. 
2.4 German Ks System 
All countries have different type of signalling equipment for different purposes around 
the world. In Germany, there are also several signal methodology used in different 
regions such as; Ks, Hp or HI system. Ks system is one of these signalling 
methodology which using in Germany since 1993 [18]. It is a relatively new signalling 
system replaced by the old ones. In this study, German Ks system has been considered 
as the signalling principle. However, all features of the Ks system have not been 
included. Otherwise, models which will be designed in the next chapters would be too 
complicated and less understandable. 
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The most important characteristic of Ks system is that the main signals are used as a 
combination of conventional main signal and distant signal. The main signal has a 
“caution” aspect besides “proceed” and “stop” to indicate next main signal's status. 
Figure 2.16 compares two and three aspect system. 
 
Figure 2.16 : Two and three aspect systems [2] 
2.4.1 Main signal 
Ks system has 3 main aspects. Figure 2.17 shows general appearance of a main signal. 
 
Figure 2.17 : Ks Main Signal [19]. 
2.4.1.1 Green: proceed 
Green light indicates the next two block are clear, proceed with full speed (Figure 
2.19). That means next main signal also has been set as yellow or green. Figure 2.18 
shows red and green signal sequence. 
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Figure 2.18 : Yellow and green light [2]. 
 
Figure 2.19 : Proceed aspect [19]. 
2.4.1.2 Yellow: proceed with caution 
Yellow light means: proceed but expect stop because next main signal shows stop. See 
Figure 2.20. 
 
Figure 2.20 : Caution aspect [19]. 
2.4.1.3 Red: stop 
Next signal block is occupied by another vehicle or it has not been set yet. Do not 
proceed. Figure 2.21 shows the red light aspect. 
 
Figure 2.21 : Stop aspect [19]. 
2.4.1.4 Blinking green: expect speed restriction 
If there is a speed limit in the next signal block, main signals shows blinking green 
(Figure 2.22). It is always used with a speed indicator or speed limit plate. 
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Figure 2.22 : Expect reduced speed aspect [19]. 
2.4.2 Distant signal 
Distant signal informs driver about aspect of the next main signal. It has only two 
aspects. Figure 2.23 shows general appearance of a distant signal. 
 
Figure 2.23 : Ks Distant Signal [19]. 
2.4.2.1 Green: expect proceed or caution 
The meaning of green aspect (Figure 2.24) in a distant signal is the next main signal is 
clear (it is green or yellow). 
 
Figure 2.24 : Distant Signal green aspect [19] 
2.4.2.2 Yellow: expect stop 
If a distant signal shows yellow aspect, that means the next main signal shows stop, 
apply brakes to stop on time. Following Figure 2.25 is the yellow aspect of a distant 
signal. 
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Figure 2.25 : Distant Signal yellow aspect [19]. 
2.4.2.3 Blinking green: expect speed restriction 
The blinking green distant aspect is the same as blinking green main aspect. It is used 
if the next main signal has a speed limit (Figure 2.26). 
 
Figure 2.26 : Distant Signal blinking green aspect [19]. 
When there are more than one distant signal in a block, the second signal used as a 
repeater signal. Little white light in bottom left shows that it is a repeater distant signal. 
Figure 2.27 and Figure 2.28 are distant repeater signals. 
 
Figure 2.27 : Distant Repeater Signal (1) [19]. 
 
Figure 2.28 : Distant Repeater Signal (2) [19]. 
If the brake distance is shorter than normal, driver is informed by a little light on the 
top left side of distant signal. Following Figure 2.29 is a short distance signal. 
 
Figure 2.29 : Short distance Distant Signal [19]. 
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2.4.3 Speed restriction signal 
Speed limits are shown by a speed board where the allowed speed limit is constant. 
But maximum speed value can change according to the position of the points in a route. 
Speed Restriction signal or speed indicator shows the allowed maximum speed in 
relevant block. If it is dark, that means there is not any speed limit.  
Ks system has two types of speed indicator. One of them is used to show maximum 
speed value after the main signal. It is located on the top of main signal frame and its 
color is white. See Figure 2.30. 
 
Figure 2.30 : Main Speed Indicator [19]. 
Other type of speed indicator shows the maximum speed value for the next signal. It 
is located just under the main signal frame and it has a yellow color. It is also used 
with distant signals. See Figure 2.31 and Figure 2.32. 
 
Figure 2.31 : Distant Speed Indicator (1) [19]. 
 
Figure 2.32 : Distant Speed Indicator (2) [19]. 
If it is necessary, both type of signals can also be used with the same main signal. See 
Figure 2.33. 
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Figure 2.33 : Both Speed Indicators with the same main signal [19]. 
2.4.4 Shunting signal 
Shunting signals are used in a depot or another area, where allowed speed limit is very 
low. There are two shunting signal aspects: Proceed and Stop. 
2.4.4.1 White: shunting allowed 
Shunting movement is permitted but driver is obliged, not to reach the maximum speed 
which defined for the shunting movements (Figure 2.34).  
 
Figure 2.34 : Shunting permitted [19]. 
2.4.4.2 Red: shunting is not allowed 
Red light in a shunting signal (Figure 2.35) means shunting movements are not 
permitted. 
 
Figure 2.35 : Shunting not permitted [19]. 
Shunting signals can also be combined with the main signal. See Figure 2.36. 
 
Figure 2.36 : Combination of Shunting and Main Signal [19].  
23 
 
2.5 Turkish Signalling System 
In Turkish State Railways, there are mainly three kinds of signal lights: four aspect 
main signal, three aspect main signal and three aspect dwarf signal. [20] 
2.5.1 Four aspects main signal 
This type of signals are generally used in the entry of a station or before a point area. 
Following Figure 2.37 shows a four aspects main signal. Principally, yellow light at 
the bottom of signal frame indicate that there is at least one point in reverse position. 
 
Figure 2.37 : Four aspects main signal [21]. 
 
2.5.1.1 Green: proceed 
Figure 2.38 shows proceed aspect means the next two block are clear, proceed with full 
speed. 
 
Figure 2.38 : Proceed aspect [21]. 
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2.5.1.2 Yellow: proceed with caution 
Yellow light means: proceed but expect stop because next main signal shows stop. See 
Figure 2.39. 
 
Figure 2.39 : Caution aspect [21]. 
2.5.1.3 Red: stop 
Red light means the signal block is occupied by another vehicle or it has not been set yet. 
Stop immediately. Figure 2.21 shows the red light aspect. 
 
Figure 2.40 : Stop aspect [21]. 
2.5.1.4 Yellow - yellow: Proceed with caution and speed restriction 
Yellow light at the bottom of the signal frame informs driver there is a point in reverse 
position. In another words, driver has to proceed with allowed maximum speed for 
reverse position points. Another yellow aspect which at top of the signal frame has 
same meaning with single yellow light described before. Following Figure 2.41  shows 
the yellow over yellow aspect. 
 
Figure 2.41 : Proceed with caution and speed restriction aspect [21]. 
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2.5.1.5 Green - yellow: Proceed with speed restriction 
Yellow light at the bottom of the signal frame has the same meaning whit previous 
yellow over yellow aspect and green light means next two signal block are clear. In 
another words, green over yellow means proceed with restricted speed because there 
is a point in reverse position. See Figure 2.42. 
 
Figure 2.42 : Proceed with speed restriction aspect [21]. 
2.5.1.6 Red - yellow: Proceed to an occupied block 
Red over yellow is a shunting aspect. It means the block is occupied but driver is 
permitted for shunting movement. Yellow light also indicates there is a point in reverse 
position. See Figure 2.43. 
 
Figure 2.43 : Proceed to an occupied block [21]. 
2.5.2 Three aspects main signal 
Three aspects main signal is used if it is not possible to have a point in reverse position. 
In that case, it is not needed a yellow signal at the bottom of signal frame. Figure 2.44  
shows a general view of a three aspects main signal. 
Three aspect main signal only has green, yellow and red aspects and all of them are 
the same with 4 aspects main signal’s green, yellow and red aspects. See the following 
Figure 2.45, Figure 2.46 and Figure 2.47. 
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Figure 2.44 : Three aspects main signal [21]. 
 
Figure 2.45 : Proceed aspect [21]. 
 
 
Figure 2.46 : Caution aspect [21]. 
 
Figure 2.47 : Stop aspect [21]. 
2.5.3 Three aspects dwarf signal 
Three aspects dwarf signal (Figure 2.48) is used if a signal block has always a point in 
reverse position.  
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Figure 2.48 : Three aspects short signal [21]. 
Three possible aspects have the same meanings with three aspects main signal. Green: 
proceed, yellow: proceed with caution, red: stop. See following Figure 2.49, Figure 
2.50 and Figure 2.51. Red – yellow aspect (Figure 2.52) means proceed over an 
uncontrolled area. After passing that aspect the train will left signalled area. 
 
Figure 2.49 : Proceed on a reverse point [21]. 
 
Figure 2.50 : Proceed with caution on a reverse point [21]. 
 
Figure 2.51 : Stop [21]. 
 
Figure 2.52 : Proceed over an uncontrolled area [21]. 
Flashing aspects also used in dwarf signals. Flashing green and flashing yellow aspects 
have the same meanings with constant green and yellow but the difference is the routes 
start in an uncontrolled area but end in a controlled area. That means there might be 
another unauthorized vehicle on the route. 
Flashing red is used for the train movements in uncontrolled areas which include a 
controlled point. Flashing red - yellow is used for the routes which is set from 
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uncontrolled area to another uncontrolled area over a controlled area. Following Figure 
2.53 shows the all flashing dwarf signal aspects. A special palate is also used with 
these signals to indicate they are flashing signals. 
 
Figure 2.53 : Flashing dwarf signal aspects [21]. 
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3. RAILWAY INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS 
3.1 What is Interlocking? 
Interlocking is a kind of internal automatic control mechanism which used between 
two or more devices, equipment or any other phenomenon. In an interlocking system, 
some status of the devices are defined as a precondition to control a certain device. In 
another words, devices cannot be controlled directly. It is designed within a system, 
which can create some hazardous results in a certain status combinations. Interlocking 
system locks the controlling of critical devices in between and allows only possible 
safe status sets. 
The working mechanism of the interlocking can be explained with a simple example. 
There is an interlocking system to protect maintenance staff against electrical shock in 
a maintenance depot of a railway operator company in Istanbul (Istanbul Ulasim A.S.). 
Some components of railway vehicles are installed over the car body with some high 
voltage equipment. The maintenance of components can be very dangerous if the high 
voltage equipment are alive.  
An overhead catenary system provides electrical power to trains in the depot. 
Maintenance staff use a platform to reach top of the trains and electrical power has to 
be switched off before anybody use this platform. The procedure which defined to 
work on the trains has to be followed by the maintenance staff when they are working 
on the train’s roof. However, if somebody reaches the train’s roof when the catenary 
line is alive, it may cause injury or death. Therefore, this problem is solved with using 
an interlocking system between the circuit breaker and the platform.  
The electricity on the catenary system is controlled by a circuit breaker, which is 
equipped with a key. This key is released only when the circuit breaker is switched off 
and the circuit breaker cannot be switched on without this key as well. On the other 
side, the platform has a locked door to prevent passage of unauthorized staff. The door 
can only be opened with a key and it does not release the key when it is unlocked. The 
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interlocking system is provided by these mechanism. For instance, the staff who wants 
to work on the trains has to use platforms but there is a locked door front of the 
platform steps. The only way to unlock the safety door is switching off the circuit 
breaker and getting the key. Conversely, it is prevented to switch on the circuit breaker 
when there is somebody on the platform. 
To sum up, almost all possible dangerous situations are prevented with an interlocking 
mechanism between system equipment. In the given example, the platform door and 
the circuit breaker represent the critical equipment in the system. The key is used as 
an interlocking tool to interlock the critical equipment. 
Nowadays, most of the new developed systems are based on software. However, it is 
still required some interlocking mechanism in safety critical systems. For this reason, 
some interlocking algorithms are developed by system engineers to ensure the safety 
in software based systems. Modern railway interlocking systems can be given as a 
good example of software based safety critical systems. 
3.2 What is the Fail-Safe? 
Safety critical systems include some equipment which are very important for the 
system safety and it is required that these equipment should be always failure-free. 
Whereas, any device or equipment cannot be fully reliable in the real world. Fail-safe 
is a design criteria used in the devices may cause some dangerous consequences when 
it fails to guarantee safety of the system [22]. In railway signalling systems, almost 
every equipment and devices are produced with respect to fail-safe criteria [23]. 
A simple example can be given to understand fail-safe logic. For instance, there is a 
security door in a bank and it should be always monitored whether it is opened. There 
is also an alarm system which is activated when the door is opened. A simple 
mechanical switch can support the information of the door’s condition. There are only 
two output: door is open and door is closed. To obtain a fail-safe system, the first 
question should be “What is the safe situation when the position switch is failed?”. If 
the switch still transmits the “door is closed” information when it fails, the system 
cannot notice the failure and the door is not being monitored anymore. Thus, anybody 
can not realize if the door is opened. Therefore, “open state” should be chosen as the 
fail-safe state. Then, in any failure on the mechanical switch, it will be seen that the 
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door is opened and the alarm system will be activated. Thus, security staff can realize 
that there is a failure in the position detection component. 
Every equipment and device has a fail-safe procedure in the railway interlocking 
system. System engineers are also consider the fail-safe procedure of all components 
used in signalling system when they are designing an interlocking system.  
3.3 Railway Interlocking Systems 
Railway signalling systems are very critical systems. Any dangerous situation which 
may occur in the system can cause very dangerous accidents. Therefore, interlocking 
systems are used to prevent any hazardous cases in the signalling systems. Interlocking 
mechanism described under the previous topic is implemented to the signalling 
equipment and it is called the railway interlocking system. 
Interlocking is the core system in railway signalling. It ensures that all signalling 
equipment are in proper status for train movement. Basically, it obtains information 
about train occupancy and locks the movable wayside elements in correct position for 
a certain route. Then, it permits movements via signals. 
Depending on the technological developments, different kind of interlocking systems 
are developed until today. The first developed system is the mechanical interlocking. 
Almost every element were mechanical equipment in the first interlocking system. 
Movable elements were being controlled by steel wires and there was not any train 
detection mechanism. Signalling operator who stays in a control tower at the station 
area checks the presence of the trains, sets the points sequentially and clears the signal 
by mechanical levers. Interlocking of the wayside equipment is achieved by a device 
called locking bed (Figure 3.1). It only permits safe possible state combination of the 
wayside equipment. 
Electro-mechanical interlocking systems are developed in the end of 19𝑡ℎ century. The 
central interlocking unit was still a mechanical device but wayside elements was being 
controlled by electrical or pneumatic actuators. 
The next technology used to developing interlocking system was relay based 
technology. In that technology, mechanical interlocking mechanisms leaved their 
objects to the complex relay based interlocking circuits. 
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Figure 3.1 : The locking bed mechanism [24]. 
They were also called “all-electric” signal boxes. Route setting was achieved by 
selecting start and target signal on the control panel (Figure 3.2). This technique was 
the first used entrance-exit (NX) method to set a route. 
 
Figure 3.2 : A relay interlocking system and a control panel [24]. 
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The next step was the development of systems with electronic component in the 1980s. 
The fact that the logic is implemented by software rather than hard-wired circuits in 
electronic interlocking technology. Modern monitors were used to manage the system 
instead of old NX panels.  
In United Kingdom, the first generation microprocessor-based interlocking called 
Solid State Interlocking (SSI) is developed. It was the brand new developed 
technology before the Computer Based Interlocking (CBI) systems. 
Nowadays, one of the new trends is to develop interlocking systems which based on 
PLC devices. Through new developed safe PLC devices, it is possible to develop safe, 
reliable and flexible PLC based interlocking systems. In this thesis study, an approach 
to develop PLC based interlocking mechanism is represented. 
3.4 Railway Interlocking Basics 
Some general basic principles of railway interlocking systems were explained in this 
chapter.  
3.4.1 Path and route 
Path is a term used to denote actual possible way on a railway in a certain condition. 
Some sample paths are shown in Figure 3.3. The railway points set the actual path in 
a railway. 
 
Figure 3.3 : Some possible paths [1]. 
Paths are arranged and all movable elements on it are locked to safe train movements 
by interlocking system. This safe path is called as “route” (see Figure 3.4). Every route 
has a starting and exit signal. 
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Figure 3.4 : Different Routes [1]. 
3.4.2 Shunting routes 
Railway coaches can be coupled and uncoupled with each other to make a complete 
train set. Movements of the rolling stocks for this purpose are called shunting 
movements and routes for the shunting movements are called shunting routes. Usually, 
shunting routes are defined in a station or a depot area. Shunting signals which have 
some different aspects from main signals are used to indicate a shunting permission. 
Shunting routes have some different procedures from normal routes. These procedures 
will be explained later. 
3.4.3 Local operation area 
Shunting movements are controlled from the train control center by a signalling 
operator. But, for some particular areas, authorization of shunting operation can be 
given to the local staff. These areas are defined as local operation areas. Once the 
operation authorization is given to the local personnel, signalling operator does not 
have any responsibility from any movement in the local area.  
3.4.4 Locking functions 
There are some special locking functions used in interlocking systems. Some of them 
are explained in this thesis. 
3.4.4.1 Simple element locking 
As it is mentioned, all movable elements have to be locked, before any movement 
permıssion of the train. Locking means that keeping an element in a certain position 
or condition to prevent any changing on its position or condition until it is unlocked. 
In other words, a locked equipment cannot be controlled until it is unlocked. For 
example, locking a point in normal position is defined as a simple locking. 
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3.4.4.2 Coupled elements 
Coupled elements are interlocked to each other directly. Some safe conditions are 
defined for coupled elements. In movable coupled elements, if any element starts to 
change its position, other one starts to move immediately to pass defined status 
according to the new position of first moved element. 
Points in the Figure 3.5 are coupled elements. Only two conditions are defined and 
both have to be in normal or reverse position. A signalling operator sends a moving 
command to the point located bottom in the figure. It changes position from normal to 
reverse. Then, other coupled point starts to move without any command from the 
signalling operator.  
 
Figure 3.5 : Coupled elements [1]. 
3.4.4.3 Unidirectional locking 
Unidirectional locking is defined for two or more elements. One of them is 
independent element and the others are dependent elements. Usually, it is defined for 
the main signal and distant signals. 
The signals shown in the Figure 3.6 are locked unidirectionally. The signal on the left 
hand side is dependent to other signal. Because it is a distant signal and distant signals 
are always dependent to the main signals. 
 
Figure 3.6 : Unidirectional Locking [2]. 
3.4.4.4 Simple bidirectional locking 
Simple bidirectional locking is applied to two or more elements when only one defined 
condition is allowed. This is a simple interlocking between the elements. Some 
element’s conditions or positions are defined as a precondition to control one of them.  
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It can be implemented to a signal and point like in the Figure 3.7 given above. In this 
bidirectional locking, normal position of the point is defined as a precondition before 
clearing the signal. On the other hand, to move point from normal to reverse position, 
signal has to show to stop.  
 
Figure 3.7 : Simple Bidirectional Locking [1]. 
3.4.4.5 Conditional bidirectional locking 
Conditional bidirectional locking is very similar to the simple bidirectional locking but 
it is defined for three or more elements. 
In the Figure 3.8, signal can only be cleared if there is a safe path ahead. Bidirectional 
locking is defined between the signal and the point on the right hand side. When the 
first point after the signal is in reverse position bidirectional locking is not considered. 
But if the first point is in normal position bidirectional locking should be considered. 
Then, it is exactly the same principle with simple bidirectional locking. 
 
Figure 3.8 : Conditional Bidirectional Locking [1]. 
3.4.5 Flank protection 
Flank protection is considered to protect a route against dangerous movements which 
may come from the flank area. Figure 3.9 shows the flank areas of the given route. 
Flank protection can be obtained by blocking points, derailing devices, signals or track 
sections. 
3.4.5.1 Point and derailing device blocking 
To protect the route, points and derailers are blocked in proper position as shown in 
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.9 : Flank Areas [1] 
 
Figure 3.10 : Point blocking for flank protection [1]. 
 
Figure 3.11 : Derailer blocking for flank protection [1]. 
3.4.5.2 Signal blocking 
If there is not any point or derailer device, signals can be blocked for flank movements. 
Figure 3.12 shows a sample situation. 
 
Figure 3.12 : Blocked signal for flank protection [1]. 
In some cases, points cannot serve flank protection and transfer it to signals or another 
points. Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 can be given as an example for this case. 
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Figure 3.13 : Transferring flank protection (1) [1]. 
 
Figure 3.14 : Transferring flank protection (2) [1]. 
3.4.6 Overlaps 
Overlap is another protection method to obtain safe braking distance behind the target 
signal. Overlap area in a route can be seen in Figure 3.15. When setting a route, it is 
required to have a free track section after the target signal and it is blocked until the 
route released. Thus, if driver does not apply brakes on time, there will be still a safe 
distance before any other vehicle or obstacle. 
 
 
Figure 3.15 : Overlap [1]. 
Signalling systems, which have a good train protection system does not provide 
overlap protection. However, it is always used in German railways. Thus, it is 
considered in this thesis study. 
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3.4.7 Front protection 
Front protection is applied to protect the route against unauthorized vehicles coming 
from the opposite direction. Point shown in Figure 3.16 is a front protection element. 
Generally, it is required, when the overlap distance is not so long. 
 
Figure 3.16 : Front protection [1]. 
3.4.8 Conflicting routes 
The routes, which use the same wayside element called conflicting routes. Only one 
route can be set in a certain time and others have to be blocked. Following Figure 3.17 
shows some intersecting routes on different wayside elements. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17 : Some conflicting routes [1]. 
40 
 
3.4.9 Deadlock situation 
Deadlock is a kind of situation, which a number of train block each other and none of 
them cannot proceed [25]. It is an unfavorable situation and should be prevented. 
Following Figure 3.18 shows some deadlock situations. 
 
 
Figure 3.18 : Some deadlock situations [2]. 
3.4.10 Multi routes 
Almost every modern signalling system uses entrance-exit (NX) method to set a route. 
But when there are more than one defined routes to reach required target signal, it can 
cause a multi route situation (see Figure 3.19). In that case, interlocking system cannot 
distinguish the required route.  
 
Figure 3.19 : Possible routes to the same signal [1]. 
To solve this problem, one of the routes is assigned as a priority route. When signalling 
operator requires a route with NX method, interlocking system sets the priority route. 
However, if the priority route is not available, it sets alternative route automatically. 
Another solution for the same problem is to design an interface for choosing the 
required route by signalling operator. 
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3.4.11 Route setting 
3.4.11.1 Main route setting 
Route setting is one of the basic functions of an interlocking system. Different 
interlocking systems can have different route setting procedures. Most general and 
important main route setting steps are explained as follows; 
 Conflicting route checking: When a route setting is requested by signalling 
operator or automatic route setting unit, interlocking system checks, whether 
there are any conflicting routes which are already set with required route. 
 Failure checking: As a second step, interlocking system checks all wayside 
equipment related the required route. Any failure is detected in the wayside 
equipment, the route setting request cannot be approved. 
 Occupancy checking: There must not be any occupied track section in the route 
path and overlap. In some routes, some track sections in the flank area also 
have to be free. 
 Setting movable elements: The next step is setting all movable elements (in the 
route path, flank area and overlap) in their proper positions and locking them. 
If any element is locked in wrong position before or is not in remote control, it 
cannot be set and the route setting request is rejected. In addition to that, it is 
also possible to get a failure message from the elements when they are moving. 
It also causes request cancellation. Furthermore, any occupancy on the points 
in the flank protection area is a reason to get a rejection from route setting 
request. 
 Locking the route and signal opening: If all steps are succeeded, the route can 
be locked and signal can be opened in proper aspect according to condition of 
the next signal.   
To implement these rules, all specifications of the routes have to be defined in the 
interlocking system. For instance, generation of a table is a method for route definition. 
Route table will be explained later. 
3.4.11.2 Shunting route setting 
As distinct from main route setting, shunting routes can be set when there are some 
occupancy in the path. However, points in wrong position cannot be set, if its track 
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section is occupied and the route cannot be set. In addition to that, flank protection and 
overlap are not considered in some interlocking systems. The rest of the rules described 
for the main routes are almost same in shunting routes. 
3.4.12 Route releasing and reversing 
After the trains traversed the running path, the route is released. Track sections in the 
path should follow a set-occupied-free sequence. Set-occupied-free sequence, 
illustrated in Figure 3.20, is defined to represent a normal train movement in a main 
route. 
 
Figure 3.20 : Set-occupied-free sequence [1]. 
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Any different sequences should be detected by interlocking system. Some abnormal 
train movement cases have been given below. Following Figure 3.21, Figure 3.22, 
Figure 3.23, Figure 3.24 and Figure 3.25 show some abnormal cases. 
 
Figure 3.21 : Decoupled wagon case [1]. 
 
Figure 3.22 : Head-on trains case [1]. 
 
Figure 3.23 : Flying train case [1]. 
 
Figure 3.24 : Going back train case [1]. 
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Figure 3.25 : Disappeared train case [1]. 
Different route releasing conditions can be described for particular routes. Following 
steps are described as a general main route terminating procedure. 
 When the first track section is occupied, start signal has to show “stop” aspect 
immediately. 
 All wayside equipment has to be kept locked until the train leaves the last track 
section. Then, they can be released. However, for operational reasons some 
equipment can be unlocked after the train passed over them. 
 To keep locked all flank protection objects can cause some operational delays. 
Therefore, special unlocking procedures are defined for flank protection 
objects. 
Shunting route termination procedure is almost same as the main route termination 
procedure. 
 
Because of some operational reasons route setting can be reversed easily, if there isn’t 
any train approaching to the starting signal. Nevertheless, if a train is approaching a 
route it cannot be cancelled immediately for safety reasons. Interlocking system waits 
for a while before cancelling the route. If the train does not enter the routing area in a 
particular time, the route is released. 
3.4.13 Route table 
Route table, also called interlocking table, is composed to list all specifications of all 
possible routes in an interlocking systems. It shows the required status of all equipment 
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in a certain route. When a new signalling system is designed, a route table is created 
as one of the first steps by system designer and all system is designed based on it. 
There is not any general form for route tables. Every system designer use their own 
route table form. An example route table (Table 3.1) is created for the simple layout 
shown in Figure 3.26. 
 
Figure 3.26 : A simple layout [1]. 
Table 3.1 : Example route table [1] 
 
Created route table shows arrangements of wayside elements for each routes. First 
column is for route names. Second column is for the starting and exit signals of the 
routes. For example, it can be easily seen that route 1 starts from the signal 7 and ends 
signal 1. “Track sections” column shows the track sections on the path and on the flank 
areas. As it is mentioned before, track sections on flank areas also have to be clear for 
the safety of routes. “Points” column is created to show names and proper positions of 
the points on the route. Objects used for flank protection can be seen in the “Flank 
protection” column. The notations “(N)” and “(R)” represents the required positions 
of the points (N: normal, R: reverse). In the “Front Protection” column, overlaps and 
points used for front protection in the related routes are listed. Lastly, conflicting routes 
are written in the last column. 
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4. FORMAL METHODS 
Formal methods are widely used for development and verification of software and 
hardware system as mathematical based techniques. According to European Standard 
EN 61508-7 formal methods described as: “Formal methods provide a means of 
developing a description of a system during specification and/or implementation 
phase. These formal descriptions are mathematical models of the system function 
and/or structure. Therefore unambiguous system description could be achieved (e.g. 
any state of an automaton is described by its initial state, inputs and the transition 
equations of the automaton) which increase understanding of the underlying system.” 
[5]. 
Formal methods play an important role to increase the completeness, consistency or 
correctness of a specification or implementation, because formal methods transfer the 
principles of mathematical reasoning to the specification and implementation of 
technical systems [5] [26]. 
Software developers for railway systems must ensure their software provides high 
level of assurance. Testing these software usually takes so much time. Nevertheless, 
regardless how much software testing is performed, it cannot be guaranteed that the 
safety feature of developed software is fully satisfied [27]. For this reason, it is 
preferred to use formal methods in their design steps, because mathematical analysis 
can be performed easily to any design created with formal methods to contribute to the 
reliability and robustness of it. 
Consequently, the goal of using formal methods is to produce an unambiguous and 
consistent specification that is as completely failure-free and with few contradictions 
as possible. However it must be simple to verify.  
There are several formal methods used for safety critical system design [28] . In this 
thesis study, only petri nets and Finite State Machines have been explained. Because 
those two methods are widely used and their graphical design interface are more 
understandable comparing with other formal methods [29]. 
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4.1 Petri Nets 
Petri nets is one of the widely used formal method to model discrete event systems 
[30]. A Petri net consists of places, transitions, and arcs. Arcs run from a place to a 
transition or vice versa, never between places or between transitions. The places from 
which an arc runs to a transition are called the input places of the transition; the places 
to which arcs run from a transition are called the output places of the transition.  
Places may have a number of marks called tokens. A transition is enabled when the 
input place has enough number of token. When enabled, it is permitted (but not 
obliged) to fire. If the transition fires, the input places to the transition loses their 
tokens, and each output place from the transition get the new tokens. 
Graphically, places, transitions, arcs, and tokens are represented respectively by: 
circles, bars, arrows, and dots. See Figure 4.1. 
   
Figure 4.1 : A Simple Petri Net Model [1]. 
Petri net properties are listed below: 
Sequential Execution: Transition t2 can be fired only after the firing of t1. This impose 
the precedence of constraints "t2 after t1" (Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2 : Sequential Execution [1] 
Synchronization: Transition t1 is enabled when there is at least one token at each of its 
input places. See Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 : Synchronization. (a): t1 is not enabled, (b): t1 is enabled [1]. 
Merging: It happens when tokens from several places arrive for service at the same 
transition. See Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 : Merging [1]. 
Concurrency: t1 and t2 are concurrent in the petri net shown in Figure 4.5. With this 
property, Petri net is able to model systems of distributed control with multiple 
processes executing concurrently in time. 
 
Figure 4.5 : Concurrency [1]. 
Conflict: t1 and t2 shown in Figure 4.6 are both ready to fire but the firing of any of 
them leads to the disabling of the other transitions. 
The resulting conflict may be resolved in a purely non-deterministic way or in a 
probabilistic way, by assigning appropriate probabilities to the conflicting transitions. 
See Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.6 : Conflict [1]. 
 
Figure 4.7 : There is a choice of either t1 and t2, or t3 and t4 [1]. 
The arcs can be defined with a weight value in some models. It is shown with the count 
of arcs between a place and a transition, or a small number over a single arc. See Figure 
4.8. 
 
Figure 4.8 : Weight of the arcs [1]. 
In that case, if the number of token inside the input place equals or greater than weight 
of the input arc, then the transition is enabled (Figure 4.9). Otherwise, the transition 
cannot be fired. 
It is not required to keep the number of token before and after firing. Following design 
in Figure 4.10 has 4 tokens on the left hand side and there is not any token on the right 
hand side. After firing, 3 tokens remain on the left hand side and places on the right 
hand side have 5 new tokens. The number of tokens is not kept. 
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Figure 4.9 : Number of token and weight of the arc [1]. 
 
Figure 4.10 : Number of token is not kept [1]. 
The notation which used to show petri net graphs is given below [31] 
(P, T, A, w) 
Where 
P is the finite set of places (one type of node in the graph) 
T is the finite set of transition (the other type of node in the graph) 
A is the set of arcs from places to transitions and transitions to places in the graph 
w: A → {1, 2, 3, …} is the weight function on the arcs. 
 
The set of places are represented by 
 
𝑃 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛}  and |𝑃| = 𝑛 
 
The set of transitions are represented by 
 
𝑇 = {𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑚} and |𝑇| = 𝑚 
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A typical arc function is represented by 
 
𝐴 = {(𝑝1, 𝑡1), (𝑡1, 𝑝1), … , (𝑝𝑘 , 𝑡𝑘), (𝑡𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)} 
 
To show weight function of an arc following notation is used. 
 
𝑤(𝑝𝑎 , 𝑡𝑏) = 𝑐 
 
Where, c is an integer shows the weight value. 
To describing a petri net graph, it is convenient to use 𝐼(𝑡𝑗) to represent to set of input 
places to transition 𝑡𝑗. Similarly, 𝑂(𝑡𝑗) represents the set of output places from 
transition 𝑡𝑗. Thus, we have 
 
𝐼(𝑡𝑗) = {𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑃: (𝑝𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗) ∈ 𝐴} , 𝑂(𝑡𝑗) = {𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑃: (𝑡𝑗 , 𝑝𝑖) ∈ 𝐴} 
 
Simple Example: 
Consider a petri net graph defined by 
 
𝑃 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3}  𝑇 = {𝑡1, 𝑡2}  𝐴 =
{(𝑝1, 𝑡1, ), (𝑡1, 𝑝2), (𝑝2, 𝑡2), (𝑡2, 𝑝3)} 
 
𝑤(𝑝1, 𝑡1) = 2  𝑤(𝑡1, 𝑝2) = 1  𝑤(𝑝2, 𝑡2) = 3  𝑤 = (𝑡2, 𝑝3) = 1 
 
Therefore we have 
 
𝐼(𝑡1) = {𝑝1}  𝐼(𝑡2) = {𝑝2} 
 
𝑂(𝑡1) = {𝑝2}  𝑂(𝑡2) = {𝑝3} 
 
It is so easy to create petri net diagram with these definitions. See Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11 : Example Petri Net diagram [1]. 
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4.2 Finite State Machines 
FSM is one of the design methods mentioned in European Norms EN 61508-7 and the 
aim of the finite state machines is described in the same standard as to model, verify, 
specify or implement the control structure of a system. Furthermore, according to the 
same standard, finite state machines defined as; “Many systems can be described in 
terms of their states, their inputs, and their actions. Thus when in state S1, on receiving 
input I a system might carry out action A and move to state S2. By describing a 
system’s actions for every input in every state we can describe a system completely. 
The resulting model of the system is called a finite state machine (or finite state 
automata). It is often drawn as a so-called state transition diagram showing how the 
system moves from one state to another, or as a matrix in which the dimensions are 
state and input, and the matrix cells contain the action and new state resulting from 
receiving the input when in the given state.” [5]. 
A finite state machine (FSM) is a mathematical modeling technique which used to 
design both computer programs and sequential logic circuits [32]. States and 
transitions are the basic elements of a FSM. States represent the currently condition of 
the model and transitions represent the actions. The basic terms which used in FSM 
are described below. 
State: A FSM is built around some finite collections of states. When modelling a 
device with a FSM, the conditions of the device are represented by states. If a point 
machine model is considered as an example, the conditions of being in normal and 
reverse position are represented by states. The number of states used in a FSM is finite. 
States are shown with a circle in a FSM diagram. 
Current State: In a FSM, only one state can be active and it is called as the current 
state. In another words, the machine can only be in a single state in a certain time. 
Starting State: Starting state is the initial state of a FSM. When a FSM is started to run, 
starting state will be current state automatically. Therefore, every finite state machine 
has a starting state. Initial state is identified by double circles in a FSM diagram. 
Transition: Transitions make a connection between two states with some conditions. 
When the conditions occur, the current state changes one to another one which 
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connected by the transition. The conditions are defined by transition functions. 
Transition function is denoted as 
𝑓: 𝑋 × 𝐸 → 𝑋 
Transitions are represented by arrows in the FSM diagrams. See Figure 4.12 for a 
simple FSM structure. 
Event Set: Event set or input set is the set of all possible inputs in a FSM. For instance, 
in a FSM which designed for modeling a lift, control buttons of the lift can be 
considered as the input set. 
 
Figure 4.12 : FSM component [1]. 
The features of a FSM are described with a simple example below in Figure 4.13. 
 
Figure 4.13 : A Finite State Machine diagram [1]. 
Event set for given FSM is 
𝐸 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑔} 
Set of states is 
𝑋 = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧} 
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Transfer functions are 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑎) = 𝑥   𝑓(𝑦, 𝑎) = 𝑥   𝑓(𝑧, 𝑏) = 𝑧 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑔) = 𝑧   𝑓(𝑦, 𝑏) = 𝑦   𝑓(𝑧, 𝑎) = 𝑓(𝑧, 𝑔) = 𝑦 
 
The notation 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑎) = 𝑥 means that if the model is in state y, then upon the occurrence 
of event a, the model will make an instantaneous transition to state x. 
A FSM is built around some finite collections of states. Each state has a number and 
name. Event a may be occurred for any reason. It could be an external input or an event 
spontaneously generated by the system modelled by the finite state machine. 
Three different cases can be seen on this example. First, an event may occur without 
changing the state. Transition function 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑎) = 𝑥 can be given as an example to these 
event. When the active state is x, event a does not change the current state of FSM. In 
some FSM models, these ineffective transition functions are not defined. 
Second case, occurrence of two different event may cause the same transition like 
𝑓(𝑧, 𝑎) = 𝑓(𝑧, 𝑔) = 𝑦. Both events change the current state from z to y. However, it 
cannot be distinguished which event caused to this transition exactly.  
Finally, as it can be easily realized from the diagram, there is not a transition function 
defined for every event. For instance, 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑔) is not defined and when the system in 
state y, occurrence of event g doesn’t caused any transition. 
After defining the basic terms, formal definition of the FSM can be given as 
𝐺 = (𝑋, 𝐸, 𝑓, Γ, 𝑥0) 
Where: 
 X is the finite set of states. 
 E is the finite set of events associated with G. 
 𝑓: 𝑋 × 𝐸 → 𝑋 is the transition function 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑒) = 𝑦 means that there is a 
transition labeled by event e from state x to state y; in general, y is a partial 
function on its domain. 
 Γ = 𝑋 → 2𝐸 is the active event function or feasible event function. Γ(𝑥) is the 
set of all events e for which 𝑓 = (𝑥, 𝑒) is defined and is called the active event 
set of G at x. 
56 
 
 𝑥0 is the initial state. 
A finite state machine diagram can be transformed to a petri net diagram. Following 
is a petri net diagram which transformed from Figure 4.13. 
 
Figure 4.14 : A petri net diagram transformed from Figure 4.13 [1]. 
If a petri net diagram is designed with only single token and all arcs have 1 weight 
value, it can also be transformed to a finite state machine. 
4.3 Formal Verification 
Once designed the FSM diagram, it is easy to obtain mathematical equation from the 
diagram. Following formulate [33] is used to describe a transition function in a 
mathematical form. 
 𝑆𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑗,𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝑠𝑖 ∙ ∏ ?̅?𝑖,𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
 (4.1) 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 
Where, 
 𝑆𝑖 is the new value of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ state. 
 𝑠𝑖 or 𝑠𝑗 are the current value of the related states. 
 𝑇𝑗,𝑖 is the transition condition from 𝑠𝑗 to 𝑠𝑖. 
 ?̅?𝑖,𝑘  is the logical inverse of the transition condition from 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑠𝑘. 
 m is the number of outgoing transition from 𝑖𝑡ℎ state. 
 n is the number of incoming transition to 𝑖𝑡ℎ state. 
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Following equations are implemented for given simple example FSM. Transitions 
which do not change the current state are ignored. 
 
𝑋 = 𝑦 ∙ 𝑎 + 𝑥 ∙ ?̅? 
𝑌 = 𝑧 ∙ (𝑎⋁𝑔) +  𝑦 ∙ ?̅? 
𝑍 = 𝑥 ∙ 𝑔 + 𝑧 ∙ 𝑎⋁𝑔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
(4.2) 
 
With using these equation, the current state of the FSM can be calculated for the next 
time interval. After starting the model, the initial state x will be current state. Therefore, 
the condition of states will be 
 𝑆 = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧} = {1, 0,0} (4.3) 
If event set is considered as 
 𝐸 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑔} = {0,0,1} (4.4) 
 
It is possible to calculate the next current state with using the equations given above. 
 
𝑋 = 0 ∙ 0 + 1 ∙ 1̅ 
𝑌 = 0 ∙ (0⋁1) +  0 ∙ 0̅ 
𝑍 = 1 ∙ 1 + 0 ∙ 0⋁1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
(4.5) 
 
𝑋 = 0 
𝑌 = 0 
𝑍 = 1 
(4.6) 
 
New current state is Z and the state matrix will be 
 𝑆 = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧} = {0, 0,1} (4.7) 
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It should be noted that, these are logical equations. Hence, “1” should be considered 
as logical “true” and “0” as logical “false”. Furthermore, the operator “+” means 
logical “or” and the operator “∙” means logical “and”. Therefore, the solution of “1+1” 
should be “1” (1+1=1). The rest of the possible calculations are  
0 + 0 = 0             1 + 0 = 1            0 ⋅ 0 = 0           1 ⋅ 0 = 0                1 ⋅ 1 = 1 
Consequently, both methods, petri nets and finite state machines, have some 
advantages and disadvantages. It is possible to model complicated systems with simple 
diagrams by using petri nets method. However, it is difficult to build the petri nets 
diagram. On the other hand, a FSM diagram can be easily built, but it expands so much 
when modelling the complex systems. In this thesis stud, FSM is used as a design 
method. Because, it is more understandable according to the petri nets.  
4.3.1 An example model 
In this topic, a turnstile controller is modeled with finite state machines method. With 
obtained model a PLC program will be written in the next chapter. 
A turnstile shown in Figure 4.15 is a kind of gate which allows one person to pass at a 
time. In some suburban station, they are used to restrict passage only to people who 
insert a coin or a ticket. In this example, the working principle of a simple turnstile 
will be described, a finite state machine model will be designed and the mathematical 
equations will be obtained from the FSM model. 
Using purpose and the working principle of the turnstile are listed below. 
 Turnstile is used to prevent the unpaid passages. It allows the passage only to 
people who insert a coin in it. 
 Initially the turnstile should be locked.  
 Depositing a coin in a slot on the turnstile unlocks the turnstile arms, allowing 
a single customer to push through. 
 After the customer passes through, the arms are locked again until another coin 
is inserted. 
 Once a coin is inserted to the slot, an internal timer starts and if nobody does 
not push the arms in a certain time, the turnstile locks itself automatically. 
 In an emergency case (fire, natural disaster, etc.), turnstile can be released 
continuously by an input.  
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 The slot box has a maximum coin capacity and it is measured with a counter 
device inside the slot mechanism. When the capacity is reached, turnstile 
blocks itself and does not allow the passage any more. In blocking state, the 
arms of turnstile are kept locked. 
 The filled slot box is changed with an empty one by the staff. After changing 
the box, staff reset the counter and the turnstile starts to working normal again. 
 
Figure 4.15 : A Turnstile [34]. 
According to the statements defined above, inputs or events of the model will be 
 𝑒1 : Coin input 
 𝑒2 : Turnstile pushed 
 𝑒3 : Timer expired 
 𝑒4 : Emergency 
 𝑒5 : Slot is full 
 𝑒6 : Reset 
Event set 
 𝐸 = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3, 𝑒4, 𝑒5, 𝑒6} (4.8) 
Defining the states is not so difficult from the statements. However, the important point 
is that the number of states should be defined optimal. If different states are defined 
for every situation, that makes the model too complicated. It is not a important criteria 
for this simple design but in another exhaustive design, large number of states make 
impossible to analyze the model. Hence, the states for our model are defined below. 
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 𝑆1 : Turnstile is locked 
 𝑆2 : Turnstile is unlocked 
 𝑆3 : Turnstile is released continuously 
 𝑆4 : Turnstile is blocked 
State set; 
 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, 𝑆4} (4.9) 
After defining the events and states, the next step will be creating the transitions and 
the transition functions. Figure 4.16 shows the possible transitions between states. 
 
Figure 4.16 : FSM diagram [1]. 
Definitions of the transition functions; 
𝑡1 = 𝑓(𝑆1, 𝑆2) = 𝑒1 (a coin is inserted to the slot) 
𝑡2 = 𝑓(𝑆2, 𝑆1) = 𝑒5̅ ∧ (𝑒2 ∨ 𝑒3) (when slot box is not full, a passenger passed through 
the turnstile or passage waiting time expired) 
𝑡3 = 𝑓(𝑆2, 𝑆3) = 𝑒2 ∧ 𝑒5 (a passenger passed through the turnstile and slot box coin 
capacity has been exceeded) 
𝑡4 = 𝑓(𝑆2, 𝑆4) = 𝑡5 = 𝑓(𝑆1, 𝑆4) = 𝑡6 = 𝑓(𝑆3, 𝑆4) = 𝑒4 (emergency input is true) 
𝑡7 = 𝑓(𝑆4, 𝑆1) = 𝑒4̅ (emergency input is false) 
𝑡8 = 𝑓(𝑆3, 𝑆1) = 𝑒6 (reset) 
Following Figure 4.17 shows the FSM diagram in terms of events. 
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Figure 4.17 : FSM diagram in terms of events [1]. 
Finally, mathematical equations can be generated with using equation (4.1) 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡5̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
(4.10) 
And, 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑒5̅ ⋅ (𝑒2 + 𝑒3) + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑒6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑒4̅ + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒1̅ ⋅ 𝑒4̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑒5̅ ⋅ (𝑒2 + 𝑒3)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ⋅ (𝑒2 ∙ 𝑒5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ⋅ 𝑒4̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ (𝑒5 + (𝑒2 + 𝑒3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)) ⋅ (𝑒2 ∙ 𝑒5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ⋅ 𝑒4̅ (De Morgan's 
law) 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ (𝑒5 + (𝑒2̅ ⋅ 𝑒3̅)) ⋅ (𝑒2̅ + 𝑒5̅) ⋅ 𝑒4̅ (De Morgan's 
law) 
𝑆3 = 𝑠2 ⋅ (𝑒2 ⋅ 𝑒5) + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑒4̅ ⋅ 𝑒6̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑒4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑒4 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑒4 
(4.11) 
The initial state is 𝑆1(see Figure 4.18). Hence, 
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 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡0 = {1, 0, 0, 0} (4.12) 
 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝐸𝑡0 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} (4.13) 
 
Figure 4.18 : Initial view of the FSM [1]. 
As a first case, if a passenger inserts a coin, the event matrix will be 
𝐸𝑡1 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} 
New current state in 𝑡1can be calculated 
 
𝑆1𝑡1 = 0 ⋅
(0 + 0) + 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0̅ + 1 ⋅ 1̅ ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆2𝑡1 = 1 ⋅ 1 + 0 ⋅ (0 +
(0̅ ⋅ 0̅)) ⋅ (0̅ + 0̅) ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆3𝑡1 = 0 ⋅
(0 ⋅ 0) + 0 ⋅ 0̅ ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆4𝑡1 = 1 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0 
(4.14) 
 
And, 
 
𝑆1 = 0 
𝑆2 = 1 
𝑆3 = 0 
(4.15) 
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𝑆4 = 0 
 𝑆𝑡1 = {0, 1, 0, 0} (4.16) 
 
Figure 4.19 : New Current State is 𝑆2 [1]. 
As it can be seen from the results, new state of the model will be 𝑆2 (see Figure 4.19). 
Same steps can be repeated to calculate the next step 𝑡2 with assuming that the 
passenger passed through turnstile on time.  
New event matrix will be 
 𝐸𝑡2 = {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0} (4.17) 
To find the new state 
 
𝑆1𝑡2 = 1 ⋅
(1 + 0) + 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0̅ + 0 ⋅ 0̅ ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆2𝑡2 = 0 ⋅ 0 + 1 ⋅ (0 +
(0̅ ⋅ 0̅)) ⋅ (0̅ + 0̅) ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆3𝑡2 = 1 ⋅
(1 ⋅ 0) + 0 ⋅ 0̅ ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆4𝑡2 = 0 ⋅ 0 + 1 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 0 
(4.18) 
And, 
 
𝑆1𝑡2 = 1 
𝑆2𝑡2 = 0 
(4.19) 
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𝑆3𝑡2 = 0 
𝑆4𝑡2 = 0 
 𝑆𝑡2 = {1, 0, 0, 0} (4.20) 
 
Figure 4.20 : Current State is 𝑆1 again [1]. 
According to the results, the model passed back into the initial state as shown in Figure 
4.20. 
Thirdly, the emergency case is simulated. In an the emergency case, new event matrix 
will be 
 𝐸𝑡3 = {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0} (4.21) 
 
The response of the model to this input matrix will be 
 
𝑆1𝑡3 = 0 ⋅
(0 + 0) + 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ 1̅ + 1 ⋅ 0̅ ⋅ 1̅ 
𝑆2𝑡3 = 1 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ (0 +
(0̅ ⋅ 1̅)) ⋅ (0̅ + 0̅) ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆3𝑡3 = 0 ⋅
(0 ⋅ 0) + 0 ⋅ 1̅ ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆4𝑡3 = 1 ⋅ 1 + 0 ⋅ 1 + 0 ⋅ 1 + 0 ⋅ 1 
(4.22) 
And, 
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𝑆1𝑡3 = 0 
𝑆2𝑡3 = 0 
𝑆3𝑡3 = 0 
𝑆4𝑡3 = 1 
(4.23) 
 𝑆𝑡3 = {0, 0, 0, 1} (4.24) 
 
Figure 4.21 : New Current State is 𝑆4 [1]. 
The new state is 𝑆4 now (Figure 4.21). This is exactly the same result with the expected 
situation. Because, an emergency signal is received and the turnstile has to pass into 
the 𝑆4. 
Finally, state conditions are calculated for a passenger passage when the turnstile is 
still in the emergency state.  
Event matrix for the new situation 
 𝐸𝑡4 = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0} (4.25) 
Behavior of the model are obtained as 
 
𝑆1𝑡4 = 0 ⋅
(1 + 0) + 0 ⋅ 0 + 1 ⋅ 1̅ + 0 ⋅ 0̅ ⋅ 1̅ 
𝑆2𝑡4 = 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅ (0 +
(1̅ ⋅ 0̅)) ⋅ (1̅ + 0̅) ⋅ 1̅ 
(4.26) 
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𝑆2𝑡4 = 0 ⋅ 0 + 0 ⋅
(1 + 0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ⋅ (1 ∙ 0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ⋅ 1̅ 
𝑆3𝑡4 = 0 ⋅
(1 ⋅ 0) + 0 ⋅ 1̅ ⋅ 0̅ 
𝑆4𝑡4 = 0 ⋅ 1 + 0 ⋅ 1 + 0 ⋅ 1 + 1 ⋅ 1 
 And, 
 
𝑆1𝑡4 = 0 
𝑆2𝑡4 = 0 
𝑆3𝑡4 = 0 
𝑆4𝑡4 = 1 
(4.27) 
 𝑆𝑡4 = {0, 0, 0, 1} (4.28) 
 
Figure 4.22 : Current state didn’t change [1]. 
The new state matrix shows that the current state will not be changed when a person 
used the turnstile. See Figure 4.22. 
Consequently, four possible scenarios have been simulated and the model has been 
responded with expected results. Other possible cases can also be simulated, however 
four scenarios are sufficient to show working principle of a finite state machine. As 
mentioned before, an implementation of the model with a PLC programming tool will 
be handled in the next chapter. 
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4.4 Implementation 
Models created with formal methods can be implemented easily with several 
programming language. In this study, PLC based systems are considered. Therefore, 
the models created with formal methods will be implemented with PLC programming 
software in this section. 
Once the model is designed and the mathematical equations are obtained, these 
equations can be defined with the relevant programming language into the 
implementation software. Obtained equations from the model are simple logical 
equations and it is not difficult to define them with any programming software. In this 
chapter, the example model which designed in the previous chapter will be 
implemented and simulated with two different PLC programming languages. 
4.4.1 Ladder diagram 
Ladder diagram is a typical technique which used to design relay based system. It is 
also used in some PLC software as a programming language. Ladder diagram provides 
a graphical programming logic and it is understandable and easy to design. Siemens 
Simatic Manager is used as an implementation tool. 
To begin with, the basic notations used in ladder logic and their equivalents in the FSM 
were listed below [35]. 
---| |--- Normally Open Contact: It represents an event in the FSM. 
---| / |--- Normally Closed Contact: It will used as the logical invers of an event in the 
FSM. 
---( ) Output Coil: It represents the States in the FSM 
The combinations of contacts and coils will represent the transition functions. 
Furthermore, some internal functions will be used such as; timer function.  
FSM model diagram of the turnstile example designed in the previous chapter is given 
again in following Figure 4.23. The model will be described as a function block in the 
software. 
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Figure 4.23 : FSM model of the turnstile example [1]. 
Firstly, the events and the states are created as inputs and outputs (Figure 4.24). 𝑆1𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 
𝑆2𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑆3𝑛𝑒𝑤 and 𝑆4𝑛𝑒𝑤  are defined to save the new values of the states. 
 
Figure 4.24 : Variable list created in the software [1]. 
Secondly, transition equations are defined. See following Figure 4.25, Figure 4.26, 
Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28. 
 𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ (𝑒2 + 𝑒3) + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑒6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑒4̅ + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒1̅ ⋅ 𝑒4̅ (4.29) 
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Figure 4.25 : Definition of 𝑆1 transition equation by ladder diagram [1]. 
 𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ (𝑒2̅ ⋅ 𝑒3̅) ⋅ (𝑒2̅ + 𝑒5̅) ⋅ 𝑒4̅ (4.30) 
 
Figure 4.26 : Definition of 𝑆2 transition equation by ladder diagram [1]. 
 𝑆3 = 𝑠2 ⋅ (𝑒2 ⋅ 𝑒5) + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑒4̅ ⋅ 𝑒6̅ (4.31) 
 
Figure 4.27 : Definition of 𝑆3 transition equation by ladder diagram [1]. 
 𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑒4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑒4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑒4 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑒4 (4.32) 
70 
 
 
Figure 4.28 : Definition of 𝑆4 transition equation by ladder diagram [1]. 
These definitions calculate the new values of the states and following codes are written 
to assign new calculated values (Figure 4.29). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.29 : Codes for assign new values to the states [1]. 
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Lastly, a timer is created to obtain a time limit after inserted a coin. It starts when  𝑆2 
is activated. If the current states is not chanced in a certain time, timer sets 𝑒3 “true”. 
However, if the current state is changed with 𝑆1, timer will be stopped (Figure 4.30). 
 
Figure 4.30 : Internal timer to obtain a time limit after inserted a coin [1]. 
A function block is created with the codes given above (Figure 4.31).  
 
Figure 4.31 : Created function block [1]. 
Used PLC programming tool has also a simulation option. It can be used to simulate 
the created program and seen the behavior of developed model without any PLC 
hardware. All cases are simulated with this tool and model responded all inputs 
correctly. Here, the responses of the model to the cases which considered in the 
previous chapter are shown in Figure 4.32, Figure 4.33, Figure 4.34 and Figure 4.35. 
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Figure 4.32 : Initial condition of the model [1]. 
 
Figure 4.33 : A coin inserted to the slot [1]. 
 
Figure 4.34 : It returns to initial state when the turnstile arms pushed [1]. 
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Figure 4.35 : In an emergency input it release the turnstile [1]. 
4.4.2 Sequential function chart 
Sequential function chart (SFC) is a graphical programming language in accordance 
with IEC 61131-3 [36]. This graphical language is based on the step-transition model. 
The sequential function chart is used to divide complex tasks into smaller units and 
define the interaction between these units. In particular, this programming language is 
suitable for the tasks in which the individual functions are integrated into an overall 
process. 
A SFC program is comprised of Steps, Actions and Transitions. In a SFC network, 
only one step can be active at a time. A step enabling condition controls when the 
transition occurs. Only when the step enabling condition is met, new steps can be 
branched.  
One of the main advantage of using SFC is that, its component are almost completely 
fulfil the component of the finite state machines. 
SilworX is chosen as a PLC programming tool to implement the same turnstile model. 
The basic component used in SFC language are explained firstly. 
Step: SFC steps describe states within SFC networks (Figure 4.36). The states in the 
FSM model will represented with steps in SFC language. Definition of the step in IEC 
61131-3 is :“A step represents a situation in which the behavior of a program 
organization unit with respect to its inputs and outputs follows a set of rules defined 
by the associated actions of the step. A step is either active or inactive. At any given 
moment, the state of the program organization unit is defined by the set of active steps 
and the values of its internal and output variables.” [37] 
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Figure 4.36 : Step symbol [1]. 
The initial step: initial step is the first step of a step chain and is active at the beginning 
of a program run (Figure 4.37). It will represent the initial state in the FSM model. 
 
Figure 4.37 : Initial step symbol [1]. 
Transitions: SFC transitions describe state changes. According to IEC 61131-3, a 
transition specifies the condition under which the control passes from one or multiple 
steps preceding the transition to one or multiple steps following the transition along 
the corresponding connection. It has exactly the same functionality with FSM 
transition (Figure 4.38). 
 
Figure 4.38 : Transition Symbol [1]. 
The short description of the other component used in the SilwoX were given below. 
Standard Input: Events defined in the FSM model will be represented by standard 
inputs in SFC language (Figure 4.39). 
 
Figure 4.39 : A standard input symbol [1]. 
The little white circle at the left hand side of the input symbol means that it is an 
inverted input (Figure 4.40). 
 
Figure 4.40 : An inverted input [1]. 
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Connector: An SFC connector represents the logical connection between a data source 
and a data sink. There are two type of connector; input and output connector (Figure 
4.41). 
 
Figure 4.41 : Input and output connector symbols [1]. 
 
A finite state machine model can be programmed easily with SFC language without 
any need to mathematical equations. It can be created using only FSM model diagram. 
The turnstile model is implemented in SilworX by using FSC language. 
Firstly, inputs and outputs are created (Figure 4.42). 
 
Figure 4.42 : Described variables [1]. 
Using created variables, all states are described with regard to FSM diagram (Figure 
4.43) as shown in Figure 4.44. 
 
Figure 4.43 : Turnstile FSM diagram [1]. 
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Figure 4.44 : All described states [1]. 
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𝑡1 = 𝑓(𝑆1, 𝑆2) = 𝑒1 
𝑡2 = 𝑓(𝑆2, 𝑆1) = 𝑒5̅ ∧ (𝑒2 ∨ 𝑒3) 
𝑡3 = 𝑓(𝑆2, 𝑆3) = 𝑒2 ∧ 𝑒5 
𝑡4 = 𝑓(𝑆2, 𝑆4) = 𝑡5 = 𝑓(𝑆1, 𝑆4) = 𝑡6 = 𝑓(𝑆3, 𝑆4) = 𝑒4 
𝑡7 = 𝑓(𝑆4, 𝑆1) = 𝑒4̅ 
𝑡8 = 𝑓(𝑆3, 𝑆1) = 𝑒6 
(4.33) 
Created function block is shown in the following Figure 4.45. Timer value is also 
assigned as an output to make possible to be monitored. 
 
Figure 4.45 : Created function block [1]. 
SilworX has also an offline simulation option. Created programs in SilworX can be 
simulated without any needs to a real PLC device. Created modes are tested via offline 
simulator and it is seen that behavior of the model to the all possible cases is the same 
with expected results. Status of the model when the simulation has just started can be 
seen in Figure 4.46. 
 
Figure 4.46 : Status of the model when the simulation has just started [1]. 
To simulate coin insert, 𝑒1 is forced to “true”. The actual state of the model is changed 
with 𝑆2 “unlocked” and the timer began to measure time period. If the passenger pass  
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through the turnstile, the arms are locked and the timer is stopped. The behavior of the 
created function block can be seen in Figure 4.47. 
 
Figure 4.47 : Passenger passage simulation [1]. 
If the time expired, the model locks the turnstile immediately as seen in Figure 4.48. 
 
Figure 4.48 : Time limit expire simulation [1]. 
The situation of the last passage when the coin box gives the “box is full” input is 
tested below. When the last coin inserted, the model waiting for the passage of people 
and then blocks the turnstile. See Figure 4.49. 
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Figure 4.49 : Turnstile blocking simulation [1]. 
In an emergency case, model release the turnstile mechanism immediately (Figure 
4.50). 
 
Figure 4.50 : Emergency case simulation [1]. 
As it can be seen from the implementations, a finite state machine model can be easily 
defined with a PLC programming software.  
As a conclusion, both software and both software language can be used to implement 
the formal models. However, sequential function charts has a more practical designing 
interface. In addition to that, it is not necessary to obtain mathematical equations to 
implement a FSM in SFC language. For that reasons, Hima-SilworX and SFC have 
been used as implementation tool and programming language in this thesis study.   
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5. MODEL STATION DESIGN 
One of the main topics of this thesis study is creation of an example railway 
interlocking model. To achieve this purpose, a model railway station is needed. All 
designs would be developed according to the specifications of the model station. It 
should be noted that, German design principles are considered in this study. 
Some considered criteria when creating the model station are listed below. 
 The model station should be a main line station. Because, a metro or tram 
station is quite simple relatively. 
 It must have the same basic specifications with a real railway station. 
Otherwise, developed model won’t be realistic. 
 It should include almost all basic wayside equipment. 
 It mustn’t be so complicated. Because, a developed model for a basic simple 
station can be adapted to any complicated station. 
With respect to these criteria, layout shown in Figure 5.1 is created. 
 
Figure 5.1 : Model Station layout [1] 
It is a small size main line station. It is designed as a station in an intersection area of 
two different line. The parallel line to the station layout is called main line. And the 
other line which linked to the station from the northwestern is called side line. Main 
line will be used more frequently than the side line. There is also one more way at the 
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bottom of station layout. However, it is an entrance to the station form a depot area or 
an industrial area. Therefore, a derailer located on it to protect the station from any 
hazardous uncontrolled vehicle may come from the depot area. 
There are four tracks and three platforms in the station. First track has no platform, 
because it is not be designed for the passenger’s usage. It can be used a shunting area 
or a parking track. Furthermore, fourth track is designed as a siding. Trains may enter 
the platform 4 from the east side and cannot proceed anymore because there is a line 
end. There are also one more line end at the ride hand side of the first track.  
The points are placed to provide trains passing between the tracks. Two types of point 
are used in the layout. The point 2 located at the west of station is chosen a double slip 
point. Because the place on that are is considered to be not so wide to using two simple 
points. The rest of the points are defined as simple point. 
5.1 Operational Concept 
The operation concept of the model station is described according to a small size 
station’s features. All required operational specifications are described below. 
5.1.1 Train types 
The train types considered in this study are used in German Railways.  
 RB (Regionalbahn), is a type of local passenger train. RB trains usually stop at 
all stations on a given line to the passengers. The length of the RB vehicles is 
relatively short and their maximum allowable speeds are less than the other 
type of trains. 
 RE (Regional-Express), is another train type used in Germany and some other 
countries. Its rank above than RB because it regularly stops only at selected 
stations on its route and the passenger capacity of RE trains is higher than RB 
trains. The vehicle length of the RE trains are more long and their maximum 
speed can be reach 160 km/h. 
 IC (Intercity), is higher classification train type. IC trains service more 
comfortable journeys over long-distances. Their passenger capacity and 
travelling speed is high, train length is long. 
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 Freight Trains are used to transport goods from one point to another point. They 
do not stop any intermediate station in their route except due to the fact that 
signal authority or abnormal reasons. Freight trains have usually very long 
vehicle length.  
5.1.2 Lines characteristics 
As it mentioned before, there are 3 types of line which have different characteristics. 
See Figure 5.2. 
 Main line, has a speed limit 120 km/h and it is used by RE, IC and Freight 
Trains. RE trains come from both directions every hour and stop at track 2. IC 
trains come from both direction every two hours. They also use track two but 
they pass without stop. Freight Trains run over track 2 or track 1 every two 
hours without stopping. 
 Side Line, is used by RB trains and its allowable speed is 80 km/h. RB trains 
journey frequency is described as one train in every hour. They enter the station 
on track 3. 
 Depot Line, is a gate way between industrial depot and main line. Therefore 
the Freight Trains and the shunting trains use it. Its speed limit is 25 km/h. 
Freight Trains run over the depot line and enter the station on track 1. Then, 
they proceed through the main line. 
 
Figure 5.2 : Lines and their speed limits [1]. 
As it explained in the first chapter, trains cannot proceed with their maximum speed 
over a point which in reverse position. The speed limits of the points used in the layout 
are shown in the following Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 : Speed limits of points [1] 
5.2 Signalling Design 
Signalling equipment are positioned with respect to characteristics of the lines and 
trains and the operational demands. Therefore, track sections and signals are located 
with regard to definitions given above. 
5.2.1 Signals 
Signal’s main purpose is to give moving authority to the train drivers. Two adjacent 
signals compose a signal block and only one railway vehicle can get a moving 
permission to enter a certain signal block. With regards to this idea, all entrance of the 
station are equipped a main signal to provide keep under control the station’s traffic. 
In front of the station entry signals, distant signals are located to inform the trains 
arriving to the station about the main signal aspects in advance. Furthermore, a single 
main signal is placed at the entrance and exit of all platforms. It is important to ensure 
platform usage by only related vehicles. Platform exit signals can also be used to give 
to the trains a departure order. In other words, they can be managed with considering 
the time schedule.  
It should also be made possible to control every shunting movements on the station. 
With this purpose, some shunting signals are positioned several location in the station. 
In some points, combined signals are assigned to provide to control of the shunting 
and normal movements in a single combined signal. See the created design in Figure 
5.4. 
85 
 
 
Figure 5.4 : Model station signal plan [1]. 
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5.2.2 Track sections 
All tracks are divided to the sections to detect the location of trains. The main criteria 
when the track sections are located is the safety and the optimal operational conditions. 
The length of the track section effects the train operations. In other words, if a track 
section is designed too long, a train occupies whole area and the other vehicles have 
to wait until the first train leaves the certain section. On the other hand, if track sections 
are designed too short, it causes more investment and maintenance costs. In addition 
to that, positioning of track detection areas are related to the signal’s position. Hence, 
positioning of the signals and track sections are always related to each other. 
For created model station layout, 21 different track sections were defined. For the 
purpose of safety and operational efficiency, every point area is separated the other 
areas by a track section. To provide the overlap protection, especial track sections are 
defined behind some platform exit signals. Created track section plan of the model 
station is given in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6. Model station specifications are also given 
as a table in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 : Model station specifications [1]. 
Name Quantity 
Track Section 21 
Point 9 
Main Signal 9 
Distant Signal 3 
Shunting Signal 4 
Derailer 1 
Station Track 4 
Platform 3 
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Figure 5.5 : Track section plan of the model station [1]. 
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Figure 5.6 : Signal and track section plan [1]. 
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6. EXAMPLE INTERLOCKING DESIGN 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains developed interlocking functions based on finite state machines 
method and their implementations in SilworX PLC programming software. Detailed 
information about the design method and implementation software were given in the 
previous chapters.  
In a complete interlocking system, there are a lot of functions developed to obtain 
various locking mechanism such as, object control functions, route functions, 
authorization functions, etc. However, in this thesis study, only object control models 
and required functions to set a main route are developed and implemented. Automata 
theory is used as a design method, because automata theory can be more easily 
designed than Petri Nets Method. It is also easy to implement an automata model with 
a simulation tool thanks to its simple and clear graphical interface.  
Firstly, developed object control models are given. Afterwards, some route setting 
functions are explained. Finally, a complete route setting mechanism for a certain route 
in the model station are generated with using developed functions. All developed 
models are generic models and they can be implemented to any objects or routes in the 
layout. 
6.2 Routes 
First of all, possible main and shunting routes in the model station are determined and 
route table shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 is generated. 
6.3 Wayside Equipment Models 
The control models for mostly used wayside elements are developed in this chapter. 
These models are the last controls between the interlocking system and the physical 
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equipment. All other functions defined in the interlocking software have to use these 
models to control wayside elements. 
Table 6.1 : Route table of the model station [1] 
 
6.3.1 Point control model 
Specifications of the point control model are listed below. 
 Point has three possible positions: Normal, Reverse or intermediate. Normal 
and reverse positions are called end positions. The third position, intermediate, 
is a temporary position which represents the moving action of the point. 
Position detection of the point is provided by the sensors in the point 
mechanism. 
 If any contradictory inputs provided position sensors is detected, point has to 
been disabled and kept in error state. 
 There should be also a time limit to detect any possible problem when the 
point is moving. If the point could not complete its moving on time, it should 
be considered as there is a problem and the point has a failure. 
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Table 6.2 : Intersecting routes list [1] 
 
 Point can be controlled in two ways: First one is the remote control. It 
represents controls by interlocking system. Second way is the local control. 
Local control is not used in normal operation conditions. In some cases, 
interlocking system can give the point control authority to local staff for 
several purpose. Then, interlocking system takes back the point control 
authority. Otherwise, the point cannot be controlled by local staff without any 
permission. In real interlocking systems, there are some extra control models 
and procedures to manage the local control mechanism. However, they are not 
considered in this study to simplify the model. 
 Point can be locked in any end position and it does not approve any command 
except unlocking command. It should be noted that this is not a physical 
locking. It is only a logical locking. 
 Point cannot be moved if there is an occupancy over it. 
 If any failure occurs on the point, it has to be kept in failure status and the 
control unit can be reset after the failure problem is solved. 
The “trail” feature has not been considered because; it would be make the model more 
complicated. An extra control mechanism can be designed for it as a future work. 
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Inputs of the model have chosen as below. 
 s_nor: Point is in normal position (sensor) 
 s_rev: Point is in reverse position (sensor) 
 occ: Occupancy (sensor) 
 go_n: Go to normal position (command) 
 go_r: Go to reverse position (command) 
 lock: Lock (command) 
 ulock: Unlock (command) 
 rem: Remote control authority (command) 
 lcl: Local control authority (command) 
 reset: Reset the model (command) 
States: 
 S1: Start (initial state of the model) 
 S2: Normal (point is in normal position) 
 S3: Reverse (point is in reverse position) 
 S4: Intermediate (point is moving) 
 S5: Move Reverse (move point to reverse position command) 
 S6: Move Normal (move point to normal position command) 
 S7: Locked (point locked) 
 S8: Error 
 S9: Local (point is in local control) 
Transition functions between the states: 
 t1= s_nor ∧ !s_rev 
 t2= !s_nor ∧ s_rev 
 t3= !s_nor ∧ !s_rev 
 t4= s_nor ∧ s_rev 
 t5= go_r ∧ !occ 
 t6= go_n ∧ !occ 
 t7= !s_nor ∧ !s_rev ∧ (T#10s) 
 t8= lok 
 t9= ulok ∧ s_nor ∧ !s_rev 
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 t10= ulok ∧ !s_nor ∧ s_rev 
 t11= (!s_nor ∧ !s_rev) ∨ (s_nor ∧ s_rev) 
 t12= rst 
 t13= ( go_n ∨ go_r ) ∧ (T#10s) 
 t14= lcl 
 t15= rem ∧ s_nor ∧ !s_rev 
 t16= rem ∧ !s_nor ∧ s_rev 
 t17= rem ∧ ((s_nor ∧ s_rev) ∨ (!s_nor ∧ !s_rev)) 
Finite state machine model has been designed as shown in Figure 6.1 with respect to 
given specifications. 
 
Figure 6.1 : Finite state model of the point [1]. 
Mathematical equations of the model: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠8 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡13 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡15 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅1
⋅ 𝑡1̅4 
(6.1) 
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𝑆3 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡13 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡16 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅
⋅ 𝑡1̅1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅4 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅3 
𝑆6 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅3 
𝑆7 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡9̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
𝑆8 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡17 + 𝑠8
⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
𝑆9 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡14 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡14 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡9̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
Created function block of the model in SilworX is shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2 : Point control function block [1]. 
6.3.2 Signal control models 
6.3.2.1 Main signal 
Main signal specifications: 
 Main signal has four different aspects: red, yellow, green and blinking green. 
 Actual aspect information is provided by feedback sensors inside the signal 
device. These sensors are used to be ensure the signal does not have any bulb 
failure. 
 Red aspect is the fail-safe aspect for main signal. In any failure occurs in the 
signal control, red aspect has to be shown. 
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 The signal can be blocked in red aspect.  
 Any failure in the speed indicator should disable the main signal (if a speed 
indicator exist with the main signal). 
 The signal cannot be cleared if one or more track section in the particular route 
has an occupancy. 
 There should be a command to cancel cleared signal. 
 If any occupancy occurs in the track sections, the signal has to show red aspect 
immediately. 
 Signal control model should be able to decide correct aspect according to the 
status of the next main signal. 
Signal model consists of three different sub-models to make it more understandable 
(see Figure 6.3). 
 Signal Main Controller Model 
 Signal Aspect Controller Model (decision maker mechanism) 
 Signal Lamp Controller Model 
 
Figure 6.3 : Signal controller sub-units [1]. 
6.3.2.1.1 Signal main controller model 
Inputs: 
 occ: Occupancy information of the track sections behind the signal (sensor) 
 set: Set signal (command) 
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 cancel: Cancel signal (command) 
 blk: Block signal (command) 
 ublk: Unblock signal (command) 
 reset: Reset the model (command) 
 lc_error: Light controller (sub-unit of signal controller) error info (internal 
input) 
 sr_error: Speed restriction controller error info (internal input) 
 lc_set: Light controller (sub-unit of signal controller) set info (internal input) 
 sr_set: Speed restriction controller set info (internal input) 
States: 
 S1: Start (initial state) 
 S2: Busy (signal is not ready to be set) 
 S3: Free (signal is ready to be set) 
 S4: Block (signal is blocked) 
 S5: Set Request (signal set command) 
 S6: Set (signal has been set) 
 S7: Error 
Transition functions between the states: 
 t1= !occ ∧ !lc_error ∧ !sr_error 
 t2= occ ∧ !lc_error ∧ !sr_error 
 t3= lc_error ∨ sr_error 
 t4= blk 
 t5= ublk ∧ !occ 
 t6= ublk ∧ occ 
 t7= set ∧ !occ ∧ !lc_error ∧ !sr_error 
 t8= lc_set ∧ sr_set 
 t9= cancel ∨ ( !lc_set ∧ S6 ∧ (T#1s)) ∨ ( !sr_set ∧ S6 ∧ (T#1s)) 
 t10= occ 
 t11= reset 
 t12= lc_error ∨ sr_error ∨ (S5 ∧ (T#2s)) 
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Figure 6.4 : Signal main controller model [1] 
Mathematical equations of the model: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡6̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡8̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
𝑆6 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 
𝑆7 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
(6.2) 
Function block created in SilworX can be seen in Figure 6.5. 
6.3.2.1.2 Signal aspect controller model 
Aspect controller is a decision maker mechanism and it evaluates the proper aspect 
with regard to next main signal’s aspect. 
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Figure 6.5 : Signal main controller function block [1]. 
Inputs: 
 occ: Occupancy information of the track sections behind the signal (sensor) 
 nssi: Next signal set information (internal) 
 nsrc: Next signal restricted speed information (internal) 
 eva: Evaluate the aspect command (command) 
 
Figure 6.6 : Signal aspect controller model [1]. 
States: 
 S1: Red (initial state) 
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 S2: Green 
 S3: Yellow 
 S4: Blinking Green 
Transition functions: 
 t1= eva ∧ !occ ∧ Nssi ∧ !Nsrc 
 t2= eva ∧ !occ ∧ !Nssi 
 t3= eva ∧ !occ ∧  Nssi ∧ Nsrc 
 t4= !eva ∨ occ 
Logical equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
(6.3) 
Created function block is given in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7 : Aspect controller function block [1]. 
6.3.2.1.3 Signal lamp controller model 
Lamp controller is responsible to control signal lamps and detections of the failures in 
the bulbs. 
Inputs: 
 r_sens: Red light feedback sensor (sensor) 
 y_sens: Yellow light feedback sensor (sensor) 
 g_sens: Green light feedback sensor (sensor) 
 occ: Occupancy information of the track sections behind the signal (sensor) 
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 set: Command from signal main controller (command) 
 y_req: Yellow request from aspect controller (internal input) 
 g_req: Green request from aspect controller (internal input) 
 bg_req: Blinking green request from aspect controller (internal input) 
 reset: Reset the model (command) 
States: 
 S1: Start (initial state) 
 S2: Red 
 S3: Yellow 
 S4: Green 
 S5: Blinking Green 
 S6: Red Command (show red signal command to the signal device) 
 S7: Yellow Command (show yellow signal command to the signal device) 
 S8: Green Command (show green signal command to the signal device) 
 S9: Error (Error state is red aspect) 
Created FSM model is shown in Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8 : Signal lamp controller model [1]. 
Transition functions: 
 t1= set ∧ y_req ∧ !occ 
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 t2= set ∧ (g_req ∨ bg_req) ∧ !occ  
 t3= occ ∨ !set ∨ (!y_req ∧ (T#100ms)) 
 t4= occ ∨ !set ∨ (!g_req ∧ (T#100ms)) 
 t5= y_sens 
 t6= g_sens 
 t7= r_sens 
 t8= set ∧ !y_req ∧ (g_req ∨ bg_req) ∧ !occ 
 t9= set ∧ !g_req ∧ y_req ∧ !occ 
 t10= set ∧ bg_req ∧ !occ 
 t11= !bg_req ∨ !set ∨ occ 
 t12= (!r_sens ∧ T#1s) ∨ g_sens ∨ y_sens 
 t13= (!y_sens ∧ T#1s) ∨ r_sens ∨ g_sens ∨ (y_req ∧ (( g_req ∨ bg_req ) ∧ 
T#100ms )) 
 t14= (!g_sens ∧ T#1s) ∨ r_sens ∨ y_sens ∨ (g_req ∧ ( y_req ∧ T#100ms )) 
 t15= (!g_sens ∧ S5 ∧ (T#2s) ) ∨ (g_sens ∧ S5 ∧ (T#2s) ) 
 t16= T#1s 
 t17= T#1s 
 t18= T#1s 
 t19= reset 
Logical equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡19 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
𝑆3 = 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅3 
𝑆4 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠8 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 ⋅ 𝑡1̅4 
𝑆5 = 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅5 
𝑆6 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅6 
𝑆7 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅7 
𝑆8 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠8 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅8 
(6.4) 
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𝑆9 = 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡17 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡13 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡16 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡15
+ 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡14 + 𝑠8 ⋅ 𝑡18 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡1̅9 
 
Function block can be seen in following Figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9 : Lamp controller function block [1]. 
6.3.3 Distant signal 
Distant signal specifications: 
 Distant signal has three aspects: yellow, green and blinking green. 
 Distant signal works always depend on its main signal. 
 Actual aspect information is provided by feedback sensors inside the signal 
device. These sensors are used to be ensure that the signal does not have any 
bulb failure. 
 Yellow aspect is the fail-safe aspect for distant signal. In any failure occurs in 
the signal control, yellow aspect has to be shown immediately. 
Inputs: 
 y_sens: Yellow light feedback sensor (sensor) 
 g_sens: Green light feedback sensor (sensor) 
 set: Main signal set information (internal input) 
 src: Main signal speed restriction information (internal input) 
 reset : Reset the model (command) 
States: 
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 S1: Yellow (initial state) 
 S2: Green 
 S3: Blinking Green 
 S4: Yellow Command (show yellow output to the signal device) 
 S5: Green Command (show green output to the signal device) 
 S6: Blinking Green Command (show blinking green output to the signal 
device) 
 S7: Error (error state is yellow aspect) 
Figure 6.10 shows created FSM diagram. 
 
Figure 6.10 : Distant signal control model [1]. 
Transition functions: 
 t1= set ∧ !src 
 t2= set ∧ src 
 t3= !set 
 t4= y_sens 
 t5= g_sens 
 t6= (!y_sens ∧ S1 ∧ T#1s) ∨ g_sens 
 t7= (!g_sens ∧ S2 ∧ T#1s) ∨ y_sens 
 t8= (!g_sens ∧ S3 ∧ T#2s) ∨ (g_sens ∧ S3 ∧ T#2s) ∨ y_sens 
 t9= S4 ∧ T#1s 
 t10= S5 ∧ T#1s 
 t11= S6 ∧ T#1s 
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 t12= reset 
Mathematical equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡6̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 
𝑆6 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
𝑆7 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠7
⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
(6.5) 
Created function block is given in following Figure 6.11. 
 
Figure 6.11 : Distant signal control function block [1]. 
6.3.4 Speed indicator 
Speed indicator specifications: 
 Several speed aspects can be used in the Speed indicators. However, speed 
indicators in the model station have only three aspect: “6” and “4” and the dark 
aspect. “6” means speed limit is 60 km/h and “4” means speed limit is 40 km/h. 
If there isn’t any speed restriction, speed indicator does not show any number 
and it means driver can proceed with max allowed line speed if the main signal 
is cleared. 
 Speed indicator is always used with a main or distant signal and it is activated 
when its main or distant signal is set. 
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 Actual aspect information is provided by feedback sensors inside the speed 
indicator device. These sensors are used to be ensure the speed indicator does 
not have any indicator failure. 
 “Dark aspect” is the fail-safe aspect of speed indicator. 
Inputs: 
 sens6: 60 km/h indicator sensor feedback (sensor) 
 sens4: 40 km/h indicator sensor feedback (sensor) 
 scr6: Speed restriction 60 km/h (internal input) 
 scr4: Speed restriction 40 km/h (internal input) 
 set: Set information of its main or distant signal (command) 
 reset: Reset the model (command) 
States: 
 S1: Start (initial state) 
 S2: Dark 
 S3: 60 km/h light command (show “6” output to the indicator device) 
 S4: 40 km/h light command (show “4” output to the indicator device) 
 S5: 60 km/h 
 S6: 40 km/h 
 S7: Error 
Created FSM diagram is given in Figure 6.12. 
Transitions: 
 t2= set ∧ scr6 ∧ !scr4 
 t3= set ∧ !scr6 ∧ scr4 
 t4= set ∧ !scr6 ∧ !scr4 
 t5= sens6 
 t6= sens4 
 t7= !set 
 t8= S3 ∧ T#1s 
 t9= S4 ∧ T#1s 
 t10= ( !sens6 ∨ sens4 ∨ !scr6 ∨ scr4 ) ∧ S5 ∧ T#1s 
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 t11= ( sens6 ∨ !sens4 ∨ scr6 ∨ !scr4 ) ∧ S6 ∧ T#1s 
 t12= ( sens6 ∨ sens4 ∨ scr6 ∨ scr4 ) ∧ S2 ∧ T#1s 
 t13= set ∧ scr6 ∧ scr4 
 t14= reset 
 
Figure 6.12 : Speed indicator control model [1]. 
Equations of the model: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡14 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅3 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
𝑆3 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 
𝑆6 = 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅1  
𝑆7 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡13 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠7
⋅ 𝑡1̅4 
(6.6) 
In following Figure 6.13, created function block can be seen. 
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Figure 6.13 : Speed indicator function block [1]. 
6.3.5 Track clear detector model 
Track clear detector model is a general model which is independent to detection 
technology. Track circuit, axle counter or any other technique can be used with this 
model. Track clear detector model only needs an occupancy info provided by a track 
clear detection device. 
Inputs: 
 occ: Occupancy information from a track clear detection device (sensor) 
 set: Set command from interlocking (command) 
 cancel: Cancel command from interlocking (command) 
States: 
 S1: Free 
 S2: Occupied (initial state) 
 S3: SET 
Designed model is given in Figure 6.14. 
Transitions: 
 t1= occ 
 t2= !occ 
 t3= set 
 t4= cancel 
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Figure 6.14 : Track clear detector model [1]. 
Equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
(6.7) 
Track clear detector function block created in SilworX is shown in Figure 6.15. 
 
Figure 6.15 : Track clear detector function block [1]. 
6.3.6 Derailer control model 
Derailer characteristics are very similar to point characteristics. They have been listed 
below: 
 Derailer has three possible positions: Active, Passive or intermediate. Active 
means the derailer is protection mode and it derails the vehicle passing over it. 
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Passive position represents derailing device is outside the rail and it prevents 
the vehicle passing. The third position, intermediate, is a temporary position 
which represents the moving action of the point. Position detection of the point 
is provided by the sensors in the point mechanism. 
 If any contradictory inputs provided position sensors is detected, derailer has 
to been disabled and kept in error state. 
 There should be also a time limit to detect any possible problem when the 
derailer is moving. If the derailer could not complete its moving on time, it 
should be considered as there is a problem and the point has a failure. 
 Derailer can be controlled in two ways: First one is the remote control. It 
represents controls by interlocking system. Second way is the local control. 
Local control is not used in normal operation conditions. In some cases, 
interlocking system can give the derailer control authority to local staff for 
several purpose. Then, interlocking system takes back the derailer control 
authority. Otherwise, the derailer cannot be controlled by local staff without 
any permission. In real interlocking systems, there are some extra control 
models and procedures to manage the local control mechanism. However, they 
are not considered in this study to simplify the model. 
 Derailer can be locked in any end position and it does not approve any 
command except unlocking command. It should be noted that this is not a 
physical locking. It is only a logical locking. 
 Derailer cannot be moved if there is an occupancy over it. 
 If any failure occurs in the derailer device, it has to be kept in failure status 
and the control unit can be reset after the failure problem is solved. 
Inputs: 
 sens_act: Derailer is in active position (sensor) 
 sens_pass: Derailer is in passive position (sensor) 
 occ: Occupancy (sensor) 
 activate: Go to normal position (command) 
 deactivate: Go to reverse position (command) 
 lock: Lock (command) 
 unlock: Unlock (command) 
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 remote: Remote control authority (command) 
 local: Local control authority (command) 
 reset: Reset (command) 
States: 
 S1: Start (initial state) 
 S2: Active (derailer is active) 
 S3: Passive (derailer is passive) 
 S4: Intermediate (derailer is moving) 
 S5: Deactivate Derailer (move derailer to passive position command) 
 S6: Activate Derailer (move derailer to active position command) 
 S7: Locked (derailer is locked) 
 S8: Error 
 S9: Local (derailer is in local control) 
Generated FSM model (Figure 6.16): 
Transitions: 
 t1= sens_act ∧ !sens_pass 
 t2= !sens_act ∧ !sens_pass 
 t3= !sens_act ∧ !sens_pass 
 t4= sens_act ∧ sens_pass 
 t5= deactivate ∧ !occ 
 t6= activate ∧ !occ 
 t7= !sens_act ∧ !sens_pass ∧ (T#10s) 
 t8= lock 
 t9= unlock ∧ sens_act ∧ !sens_pass 
 t10= unlock ∧ !sens_act ∧ sens_pass 
 t11= (!sens_act ∧ !sens_pass) ∨ (sens_act ∧ sens_pass) 
 t12= reset 
 t13= ( activate ∨ deactivate ) ∧ (T#10s) 
 t14= local 
 t15= remote ∧ sens_act ∧ !sens_pass 
 t16= remote ∧ !sens_act ∧ sens_pass 
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 t17= remote ∧ ((sens_act ∧ sens_pass) ∨ (!sens_act ∧ !sens_pass)) 
 
Figure 6.16 : Derailer control model [1]. 
Equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠8 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡13 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡15 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅1
⋅ 𝑡1̅4 
𝑆3 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡13 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡16 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅
⋅ 𝑡1̅1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅4 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅3 
𝑆6 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅3 
𝑆7 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡9̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
(6.8) 
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𝑆8 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡17 + 𝑠8
⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
𝑆9 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡14 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡14 + 𝑠9 ⋅ 𝑡9̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
Function block (Figure 6.17): 
 
Figure 6.17 : Derailer control model [1]. 
6.4 Route Setting Model 
The functions used for the route mechanism are modelled in this chapter. Four models 
are generated to obtain a route setting procedure with respect to the route setting rules 
described in previous chapters. One of them is the main controller and the others are 
sub-units of the main controller. Figure 6.19 shows the interactions between the 
models. 
 Route Main Controller 
 Route Point Controller  
 Route Signal Controller  
 Route Track Section Controller  
 Route Derailer Controller 
6.4.1 Route point controller  
Route point controller are used to control all points in a certain route. It provides 
availability and proper position information of all points in a certain route to the route 
main controller. It can set and lock all points with a single command sent from the 
route main controller. 
Inputs: 
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 P(1)pos: The proper position info of the first point on the route (sensor) 
 P(2)pos: The proper position info of the second point on the route (sensor) 
 P(3)pos: The proper position info of the third point on the route (sensor) 
 P(4)pos: The proper position info of the fourth point on the route (sensor) 
 P(5)pos: The proper position info of the fifth point on the route (sensor) 
 P(1)lock: Locking info of the first point on the route (internal input) 
 P(2)lock: Locking info of the second point on the route (internal input) 
 P(3)lock: Locking info of the third point on the route (internal input) 
 P(4)lock: Locking info of the fourth point on the route (internal input) 
 P(5)lock: Locking info of the fifth point on the route (internal input) 
 available: All points are available for the position changing (internal input) 
 set_all: Set all points to the correct position according to the route (command) 
States: 
 S1: Incorrect (initial state) (at least one point on the route is not in correct 
position) 
 S2: Correct (all points on the route are in correct position) 
 S3: Locked (all points on the route are locked) 
 S4: Moving Request (move points to the correct position) 
 S5: Locking Request (lock all points in proper position) 
 S6: Not Available (at least one point on the route is not available) 
FSM model can be seen in Figure 6.18. 
 
Figure 6.18 : Route points control model [1]. 
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Figure 6.19 : Route setting main and sub-controllers [1]. 
Transitions: 
 t1= P(1)pos ∧ P(2)pos ∧ P(3)pos ∧ P(4)pos ∧ P(5)pos 
 t2= !(P(1)pos ∧ P(2)pos ∧ P(3)pos ∧ P(4)pos ∧ P(5)pos) 
 t3= P(1)lock ∧ P(2)lock ∧ P(3)lock ∧ P(4)lock ∧ P(5)lock 
 t4= !( P(1)lock ∧ P(2)lock ∧ P(3)lock ∧ P(4)lock ∧ P(5)lock) 
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 t5= available ∧ set_all 
 t6= set_all 
 t7= S4 ∧ T#15s 
 t8= S5 ∧ T#2s 
 t9= (!P(1)pos ∧ P(1)lock) ∨ (!P(2)pos ∧ P(2)lock) ∨ (!P(3)pos ∧ P(3)lock) ∨ 
(!P(4)pos ∧ P(4)lock) ∨ (!P(5)pos ∧ P(5)lock) 
 t10= !t9 
Equations of the model: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡6̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
𝑆6 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 
(6.9) 
Function block in SilworX (Figure 6.20): 
 
Figure 6.20 : Route point controller function block [1]. 
6.4.2 Route signal controller 
Route signal controller is used to control and monitor start signal, exit signal and all 
flank protection signals. 
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Inputs: 
 s_ready: Starting signal, target signal, flank protection signals are ready 
(internal input) 
 ss_set: Starting signal is in “set” state (internal input) 
 ss_block: Starting signal is in “blocked” state (internal input) 
 fs_lock: Flank protection signals are blocked (internal input) 
 set: Set starting signal (command) 
 block_ss: Block starting signal (command) 
 unblock_ss: Unblock starting signal (command) 
States: 
 S1: Busy (initial state) (at least one signal is not available in the particular 
route) 
 S2: Ready (all signals are in the proper condition for setting) 
 S3: SET (starting signal has been set and all flank protection signals have been 
locked) 
 S4: Blocked (starting signal has been blocked in red aspect) 
 S5: set_req (set signals to the star signal device and blocking signal to the flank 
protection signals) 
FSM model (Figure 6.21): 
 
Figure 6.21 : Route signal controller model [1]. 
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Transitions: 
 t1= s_ready 
 t2= !s_ready 
 t3= set 
 t4= ss_set ∧ fs_locked 
 t5= !ss_set 
 t6= block_ss 
 t7= unblock_ss 
 t8= S5 ∧ T#1s 
Equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡6̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
(6.10) 
Function block is programed in SilworX software (Figure 6.22). 
 
Figure 6.22 : Route signals controller function block [1]. 
6.4.3 Route track sections controller 
This function provides status of all track sections in the route. It can obtain that all 
track sections in the route are free or there is an occupancy at least in one of them. In 
addition to that, route track section controller can set all track section with a single 
command. 
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Inputs: 
 T(1)occ: Occupancy information of the first track section (sensor) 
 T(2)occ: Occupancy information of the second track section (sensor) 
 T(3)occ: Occupancy information of the third track section (sensor) 
 T(4)occ: Occupancy information of the fourth track section (sensor) 
 T(5)occ: Occupancy information of the fifth track section (sensor) 
 T(6)occ: Occupancy information of the sixth track section (sensor) 
 T(1)set: Set information of the first track section (internal input) 
 T(2)set: Set information of the second track section (internal input) 
 T(3)set: Set information of the third track section (internal input) 
 T(4)set: Set information of the fourth track section (internal input) 
 T(5)set: Set information of the fifth track section (internal input) 
 T(6)set: Set information of the sixth track section (internal input) 
 T(overlap)occ: Occupancy information of the overlap section (sensor) 
 set_all: Set all track sections (command) 
 clear_all: Clear all track sections (command) 
 reset: Reset the model (command) 
States: 
 S1: Ready (initial state) (all track sections in the route are free) 
 S2: Occupied (at least one track section in the route is occupied) 
 S3: SET (all track sections in the route have been set) 
 S4: Partial Set (some track sections in the route have been set and the others 
not) 
 S5: Set Request (setting command to all track section control models) 
 S6: Cancel Request (cancel all track sections which have already been) 
 S7: Error 
Designed model (Figure 6.23): 
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Figure 6.23 : Route track sections model [1]. 
Transitions: 
 t1= T(1)occ ∨ T(3)occ ∨ T(3)occ ∨ T(4)occ ∨ T(5)occ ∨ T(6)occ ∨ 
T(overlap)occ 
 t2= !T(1)occ ∧ !T(3)occ ∧ !T(3)occ ∧ !T(4)occ ∧ !T(5)occ ∧ !T(6)occ ∧ 
!T(overlap)occ 
 t3= set_all 
 t4= T(1)set ∧ T(2)set ∧ T(3)set ∧ T(4)set ∧ T(5)set ∧ T(6)set 
 t5= clear_all 
 t6= !T(1)set ∧ !T(2)set ∧ !T(3)set ∧ !T(4)set ∧ !T(5)set ∧ !T(6)set 
 t7= !T(1)set ∨ !T(2)set ∨ !T(3)set ∨ !T(4)set ∨ !T(5)set ∨ !T(6)set 
 t8= t2 ∧ clear_all 
 t9= t6 ∧ (T(1)set ∨ T(2)set ∨ T(3)set ∨ T(4)set ∨ T(5)set) ∨ T(6)set) 
 t10= S6 ∧ T#2s 
 t11= S5 ∧ T#2s 
 t12= reset 
Equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡12 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
(6.11) 
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𝑆4 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅1 
𝑆6 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡6̅ ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 
𝑆7 = 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡11 + 𝑠7 ⋅ 𝑡1̅2 
 
Function block of route track sections controller can be seen in Figure 6.24. 
 
Figure 6.24 : Route track sections controller [1]. 
6.4.4 Route derailer controller 
Route derailer controller is used to control all derailer in a certain route. It provides 
availability and proper position information of all derailers in a certain route to the 
route main controller. Route derailer controller can set and lock all derailers with a 
single command which is sent from the route main controller. 
Inputs: 
 D(1)pos: The proper position info of the first derailer on the route (internal 
input) 
 D(2)pos: The proper position info of the second derailer on the route (internal 
input) 
 D(3)pos: The proper position info of the third derailer on the route (internal 
input) 
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 D(4)pos: The proper position info of the fourth derailer on the route (internal 
input) 
 D(5)pos: The proper position info of the fifth derailer on the route (internal 
input) 
 D(1)lock: Locking info of the first derailer on the route (internal input) 
 D(2)lock: Locking info of the second derailer on the route (internal input) 
 D(3)lock: Locking info of the third derailer on the route (internal input) 
 D(4)lock: Locking info of the fourth derailer on the route (internal input) 
 D(5)lock: Locking info of the fifth derailer on the route (internal input) 
 available: All derailers are available for the position changing (internal input) 
 set_all: Set all derailers to the correct position according to the route 
(command) 
States: 
 S1: Incorrect (at least one derailer on the route is not in correct position) 
 S2: Correct (all derailers on the route are in correct position) 
 S3: Locked (all derailers on the route are locked) 
 S4: Moving Request (move derailers to the correct position) 
 S5: Locking Request (lock all derailers in proper position) 
 S6: Not Available (at least one derailer on the route is not available) 
Designed model is shown in Figure 6.25. 
 
Figure 6.25 : Route derailer control model [1]. 
Transitions: 
 t1= D(1)pos ∧ D(2)pos ∧ D(3)pos ∧ D(4)pos ∧ D(5)pos 
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 t2= !(D(1)pos ∧ D(2)pos ∧ D(3)pos ∧ D(4)pos ∧ D(5)pos) 
 t3= D(1)lock ∧ D(2)lock ∧ D(3)lock ∧ D(4)lock ∧ D(5)lock 
 t4= !( D(1)lock ∧ D(2)lock ∧ D(3)lock ∧ D(4)lock ∧ D(5)lock) 
 t5= available ∧ set_all 
 t6= set_all 
 t7= S4 ∧ T#15s 
 t8= S5 ∧ T#2s 
 t9= (!D(1)pos ∧ D(1)lock) ∨ (!D(2)pos ∧ D(2)lock) ∨ (!D(3)pos ∧ D(3)lock) ∨ 
(!D(4)pos ∧ D(4)lock) ∨ (!D(5)pos ∧ D(5)lock) 
 t10= !t9 
Equations of the model: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡10 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡7 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ ⋅ 𝑡9̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡8 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡6̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠5 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ ⋅ 𝑡7̅ 
𝑆5 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡6 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡3̅ ⋅ 𝑡8̅ 
𝑆6 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡9 + 𝑠6 ⋅ 𝑡1̅0 
(6.12) 
Function block of route derailer controller in SilworkX can be seen in Figure 6.26. 
 
Figure 6.26 : Route derailer controller function block [1]. 
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6.4.5 Route main controller 
Route main controller is the main controller for route setting. It uses four sub-models 
given above.  
Inputs: 
 set: Set the route (command) 
 sig_ready: Signals are ready info from the route signals controller (internal 
input) 
 sw_ready: Points are ready info from the route point controller if it exists in 
the route (internal input) 
 dr_ready: Derailers are ready info from the route derailer controller if it exists 
in the route (internal input) 
 ts_ready: Track sections are ready info from the route track sections controller 
(internal input) 
 ts_set: Track sections have been set (internal input) 
 dr_set: Derailer have been set (internal input) 
 sw_set: Points have been set (internal input) 
 sig_set: Signals have been set (internal input) 
States: 
 S1: Busy (initial state) (the route is not available) 
 S2: Ready (the route is ready to be set) 
 S3: Set Request (set command to all sub-controllers) 
 S4: Set (the route has been set) 
Created FSM model (Figure 6.27): 
 
Figure 6.27 : Route main controller model [1]. 
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Transitions: 
 t1= sig_ready ∧ sw_ready ∧ dr_ready ∧ ts_ready 
 t2= !sig_ready ∨ !sw_ready ∨ !dr_ready ∨ !ts_ready 
 t3= set 
 t4= tr_set ∧ dr_set ∧ sw_set ∧ sig_set 
 t5= !tr_set ∨ !dr_set ∨ !sw_set ∨ !sig_set 
Equations: 
 
𝑆1 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡5 + 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1̅ 
𝑆2 = 𝑠1 ⋅ 𝑡1 + 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡2̅ ⋅ 𝑡3̅ 
𝑆3 = 𝑠2 ⋅ 𝑡3 + 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4̅ 
𝑆4 = 𝑠3 ⋅ 𝑡4 + 𝑠4 ⋅ 𝑡5̅ 
(6.13) 
Route main controller function block is shown in following Figure 6.28. 
 
Figure 6.28 : Route main controller function block [1]. 
6.5 Sample Route Interlocking Design 
In this chapter, first route in the route table of the model station will be implemented 
with using developed FSM models. The specifications and appearance of route 1 can 
be seen in Figure 6.29 and Figure 6.30. 
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Figure 6.29 : Route 1 elements in the route table [1]. 
 
Figure 6.30 : Objects have been created with respect to the route table. 
6.5.1 Object models 
Track sections: 
Track section controls in the route 1 are created using track clear detection control 
model. The same model is duplicated for all track sections because; it is a generic 
model. T11 and T18 are not elements of the route 1 but they have to be created to 
provide occupancy information of points in flank protection.  
Track section occupancy inputs are defined as global variables to simulate them 
manually. Set commands of the track sections are connected with only route 1 because 
the other routes are not designed. There can be other route’s set command connected 
with an “OR” gate to the same input. See Figure 6.31. 
Connectors with relevant names are defined for all outputs of the function blocks to 
make it reachable from all other functions. 
Points: 
Figure 6.32 and Figure 6.33 show created point controls in the route 1. 
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Figure 6.31 : Created track sections in the route 1 [1]. 
There are 3 points in the route path and 3 more points in the flank area. Their control 
models are generated. However, there must be real a point machine which connected 
to them to monitor their workings. Therefore, a simple point simulator is designed to 
simulate behavior of a simple point. Different point moving time can be defined for 
every points if they have different moving times. “Change” input in the point simulator 
can be used to control the point in the local control. 
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Figure 6.32 : Created point controls in the route 1 (1) [1]. 
 
Figure 6.33 : Created point controls in the route 1 (2) [1]. 
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Signals: 
 
Figure 6.34 : Created starting signal of route 1 [1]. 
 
Figure 6.35 : Created exit signal of route 1 [1]. 
 
Figure 6.36 : Created distant signal of route 1 [1]. 
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Starting signal (Figure 6.34), exit signal (Figure 6.35) and distant signal (Figure 6.36) 
are generated with relevant function blocks. However, exit signal is not generated 
completely because; all features of the exit signal are not necessary for route 1. 
Simulation functions are also used to obtain required feedbacks to the signal control 
models. 
6.5.2 Route function models 
All route setting functions are generated with proper inputs and outputs. Sequence of 
the route setting starts with arrangements of the points and continues with track 
sections setting and signal setting respectively. 
Route point controller (Figure 6.37) model is developed for maximum 5 points, but 
more than 5 points can be connected to it with using logical “AND” gates. 
 
Figure 6.37 : Route 1 point controller [1]. 
Route track sections controller (Figure 6.38) has 6 track section inputs. When there are 
less than 6 points, one of them can be duplicated to empty inputs. Route 1 has only 4 
track sections. Therefore, T2 is connected also as fifth and sixth track section. 
 
Figure 6.38 : Route 1 track sections controller [1]. 
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Locking states of the signals in flank protection are connected to fs_lock input in the 
signal controller (Figure 6.39). However, route 1 does not have any flank protection 
signal. Therefore, a logical constant “True” is connected to fs_lock input.  
 
Figure 6.39 : Route 1 signals controller [1]. 
Route 1 main controller (Figure 6.40) is the main function block to set route 1. It 
evaluates the conditions of route elements continuously. If all elements are in 
convenient for route 1, “ready” output is activated and it starts to be available for route 
setting demand (conflicting routes protection are not considered). In other words, if it 
is not ready to be set, setting demand would be rejected. Following Figure 6.41 shows 
a simulation of the situation when there is an occupancy in the T12. Route 1 cannot be 
set because of an occupancy in T12. Red lines represent “active line” or logical “true” 
and blue lines represent “passive line” or logical “false” in the simulation. 
When the set input is forced, route setting procedure are started. To obey route setting 
sequence, main controller send a command to the route point controller firstly. After 
all points are locked in proper positions track circuits are set. Finally, clearing 
command is sent to the route signal controller. Once the feedback is received from the 
signal controller, route setting function is completed. 
 
Figure 6.40 : Route 1 main controller [1]. 
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Figure 6.41 : An occupancy situation in T12 [1]. 
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7. RAMS 
7.1 Introduction 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability & Safety (RAMS) is defined to indicate the 
quality and working performance of a system. It is a system characteristic and can be 
achieved by the application of some particular methods, tools and techniques which 
performed through whole lifecycle of the system [38]. Figure 7.1 shows the complete 
lifecycle of a system. It is also called “V diagram”. 
 
Figure 7.1 : The lifecycle phases of a system [38] 
The European Standard EN 50126 explains processes for the specification and 
demonstration of RAMS requirements. Basic elements of the RAMS are described in 
the same standard as: 
Reliability: probability that an item can perform a required function under given 
conditions for a given time interval. 
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Availability: ability of a product to be in a state to perform a required function under 
given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time interval assuming that 
the required external resources are provided. 
Maintainability: probability that a given active maintenance action, for an item under 
given conditions of use can be carried out within a stated time interval when the 
maintenance is performed under stated conditions and using stated procedures and 
resources. 
Safety: the state of a system freedom from unacceptable risk of harm. 
7.1.1 Essential terms related to probability used for RAMS 
Probability Distribution Function; A probability distribution is a mapping of all the 
possible values of a random variable to their corresponding probabilities for a given 
sample space. It is denoted for discrete systems as 
 P(𝑋 = 𝑥) (7.1) 
Or shortly, 
P(𝑥) 
The probability distribution function is defined to obtain the probability for this 
random variable to take on a given value. The probability distribution function also 
known probability density function (PDF) is denoted as 
 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥) (7.2) 
Cumulative Distribution Function; The cumulative distribution function is defined for 
a random variable and it provides, for each value x, the probability of a result less than 
or equal to X 
 F(𝑥) = P(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥) (7.3) 
For continuous random variables, it is defined by 
 F(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑡
−∞
 (7.4) 
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If the random variable is assumed to be ∞ 
 F(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 1
∞
−∞
 (7.5) 
That means total area under the probability distribution curve is equal to unity. 
Failure rate; Failure rate (also known as hazard rate) is described as the failure 
frequency of a component or system in a certain time. It is often denoted by 𝜆 and 
expressed by 
 𝜆(𝑡) =
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑅(𝑡)
=
−
𝑑
𝑑𝑡 𝑅
(𝑡)
𝑅(𝑡)
 (7.6) 
Where 
𝜆(𝑡) : hazard rate (i.e., time-dependent failure rate) 
𝑓(𝑡) : failure distribution function 
𝑅(𝑡) : reliability function 
Hazard rate function of an engineering system has a characteristic as can be show in 
the Figure 7.2. This curve is called bathtub.  
 
Figure 7.2 : Bathtub curve [39]. 
As shown in the figure, bathtub curve is divided into three regions: burn-in period, 
useful-life period and wear-out period. Burn-in period represents the early life of the 
system and in this area the failure rate is high but rapidly decreasing as defective 
products are identified and discarded. Some reasons for the occurrence of failure in the 
burn-in period can be listed as follows. 
 Inadequate manufacturing methods 
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 Substandard control 
 Poor quality materials 
 Poor processes 
 Inadequate debugging 
 Human failures 
During the useful life period, the hazard rate remains constant. Following reasons can 
be given for the occurrence of failure in this period. 
 Weak safety factors 
 Abuse 
 Higher random stress than expected 
 Undetectable defects 
 Natural failures 
 Human failures 
In the late life of the product, the failure rate increases, as age and wear take their toll 
on the system. Some failure reasons in the wear-out period are: 
 Poor maintenance 
 Wear due to aging 
 Wear due to friction 
 Corrosion 
Repair Rate; Repair rate is the number of repairs of a component in a certain time and 
is represented by μ. Failure rate and repair rate can be defined as follows 
λ =
number of failures of a component in the given period of time
total period of time the component was operating
 
μ =
number of repairs of a component in the given period of time
total period of time the component was repaired
 
Reliability Function; Reliability function is a property of any random variable that 
maps a set of events associated with failure of some system, onto time. 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) (7.7) 
In exponential form, 
137 
 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒− ∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑(𝑡)
𝑡
0  (7.8) 
Mean Time to Failure; Mean time to failure (MTTF) represents the mean time 
expected until the first failure in the system. It is defined for non-repairable systems. 
It can be calculated with reliability function by following equation 
 MTTF = ∫ R(t)dt
∞
0
 (7.9) 
Mean Time Between Failures; Mean time between failures (MTBF) is the predicted 
elapsed time between inherent failures of a system during operation. The difference 
between MTTF and MTBF is that while MTBF is used for products than that can be 
repaired and returned to use (repairable systems), MTTF is used for non-repairable 
systems. 
Mean Time to Repair; Mean time to repair (MTTR) is the average time required to 
repair a component in the system. It is considered for repairable system and it is very 
important in terms of maintenance optimization.  
7.2 RAMS Methods 
There are several methods used to calculate RAMS parameters of a system. Some of 
them are given below: 
 Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 Markov Model 
 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
 Interface Safety Analysis 
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
In this chapter, Fault-Tree Analysis and Markov Method are used to obtain some 
particular RAMS parameter. Other methods also can be used but they are chosen 
because they can be implement easily to the railway systems. 
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7.2.1 Fault-Tree analysis 
Fault-tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used method to evaluate the reliability of a system 
especially in its design and development phase. Nuclear power generation and railway 
signalling systems can be given as example industries which used this method. This 
type of critical systems have some particular undesirable events and they can cause 
several dangerous consequences. In fault-tree analysis, all basic events which can be 
lead undesirable events, known as the top event, are described and the logical 
relationship of them are determined. This logical relationship is easily depicted with 
using a tree structure and basic logic gates such as AND, OR, etc. 
Some important main objectives of the FTA are listed below. 
 To identify critical areas and cost-effective improvements. 
 To understand the functional relationship of system failures. 
 To satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 
 To confirm the ability of the system to satisfy its imposed safety related 
requirements. 
 To understand the degree of protection that the design concept provides against 
failures. 
Following prerequisites should be considered before performing a FTA. 
 Design, operation and maintenance of the system should be understood clearly. 
 Analysis scope and objectives should be defined clearly. 
 Clear definition of what constitutes system failure (undesirable event) 
 Definition of system physical bounds and system interfaces clearly. 
 Identification of associated assumptions 
 A comprehensive review of system operational experience. 
The first step should be determining of the top event in a FTA. Basic fault events that 
can cause the occurrence of the top event are generated and connected with logic gates.  
Basic event can be a failure of an elementary component or part. The basic fault-event 
parameters are failure probability, failure rate, unavailability and repair rate. 
Basic fault-tree symbols are shown in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3 : Basic fault-tree symbols [1]. 
To calculate the occurrence probability of the top event, all basic events occurrence 
probabilities have to be known. The occurrence probability of an OR gate can be 
calculated with following equation [40]. 
 𝑃(𝐴) = 1 − ∏{1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑖)}
𝑚
𝑖=1
 (7.10) 
Where, 
A : OR gate output fault event  
𝑃(𝐴) : occurrence probability of the OR gate output fault event A 
m : number of OR gate input fault events 
𝑃(𝐴𝑖): probability of occurrence of the OR gate input fault event 𝐴𝑖, for i = 1,2,…,m 
Occurrence probability of the AND is given by [40] 
 𝑃(𝐵) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐵𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1
 (7.11) 
B : AND gate output fault event  
𝑃(𝐵) : occurrence probability of the AND gate output fault event B 
k : number of AND gate input fault events 
𝑃(𝐴𝑖): probability of occurrence of the AND gate input fault event 𝐵𝑖, for i = 1,2,…,k 
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An example fault-tree analysis have been implemented to explain these calculations. 
Assume that there are four light bulbs for lightening a room and a switch is used to 
control the bulbs. There is also a fuse which protect the system. The probability of 
“dark room” event can be calculated easily by fault-tree analysis. 
The top event is “dark room” and the intermediate events which cause the occurrence 
of “dark room” are: 
 Power supply failure 
 Switch failure 
 All bulbs have failure 
The fault tree of this example can be seen in Figure 7.4. 
 
Figure 7.4 : Example fault tree [1]. 
If the occurrence probabilities of the base event are given as: 
 P(A) = 0.07 
 P(B) = 0.06 
 P(C) = 0.05 
 P(D) = 0.04 
 P(E) = 0.03 
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 P(F) = 0.02 
 P(G) = 0.01 
To calculate intermediate events H and I the equation (7.10) and (7.11) are used. 
𝑃(𝐻) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐻𝑖)
4
𝑖=1
 
𝑃(𝐻) = (𝑃(𝐴)) ⋅ (𝑃(𝐵)) ⋅ (𝑃(𝐶)) ⋅ (𝑃(𝐷)) 
𝑃(𝐻) = (0.07) ⋅ (0.06) ⋅ (0.05) ⋅ (0.04) 
 𝑃(𝐻) = 0.0000084 (7.12) 
Similarly, 
𝑃(𝐼) = 1 − ∏{1 − 𝑃(𝐼𝑖)}
2
𝑖=1
 
𝑃(𝐼) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑃(𝐸)) ⋅ (1 − 𝑃(𝐹))] 
𝑃(𝐼) = 1 − [(1 − 0.03) ⋅ (1 − 0.02)] 
 𝑃(𝐼) = 0.0494 (7.13) 
 
Finally, 𝑃(𝑇) can be calculated with 𝑃(𝐻) and 𝑃(𝐼), 
𝑃(𝑇) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑃(𝐻) ) ⋅ (1 − 𝑃(𝐼)) ⋅ (1 − 𝑃(𝐺))] 
𝑃(𝑇) = 1 − [(1 − 0.0000084) ⋅ (1 − 0.0494) ⋅ (1 − 0.01)] 
 𝑃(𝑇) = 0.0589 (7.14) 
Thus, probability of occurrence of top event (“dark room”) is 0.0589. 
7.2.2 Markov model 
Markov model is another widely used method to perform reliability analysis of several 
engineering systems including railways. Generally, it is used to model repairable 
systems with constant failure and repair rates. Markov models can be defined for 
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continuous and the discrete time [41]. In this chapter, only discrete Markov models are 
considered. 
For a given system, a Markov model consist of a set of all possible states, transitions 
between those states and the conditions described for the transitions. Conditions of the 
transitions are generally consist of failures and repairs in reliability analysis. A Markov 
model is represented with a graph as shown in Figure 7.5. The circles symbolize the 
states and arrows denoting the transition paths between states. Following graph is a 
simple Markov model. 
 
Figure 7.5 : A simple markov model [1]. 
In this Markov model, the system has only two states designated 1 and 2. The 
probabilities of remaining in or leaving a particular state in a finite time are also shown 
in the figure. As it mentioned before, the probabilities in the markov model are 
assumed to be constant for all times into the future. 
If it is assumed that the system is in state 1 in the first time interval, the system can 
remain in state 1 with a probability of 1/2 or it can move into the state 2 with the same 
probability (1/2). Similarly, once the system is in state 2, it can remain in it with a 
probability of 3/4 or it can pass back to state 1 with a probability of 1/4 during the next 
time interval. This states can also be represented by a matrix called transition 
probability matrix. 
𝑃 = [
𝑃11 𝑃12
𝑃21 𝑃22
] = [
1
2
1
2
1
4
3
4
] 
Where 
P : transition probability matrix. 
The important point is that the sum of the probabilities defined for a state must be 
unity. This principle applies equally to all systems no matter what degree of 
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complexity exist or how many transitions there are between the states. The sum of the 
probabilities of remaining in or moving out of a state must be unity. 
The behavior of the system are illustrated for three time interval in the Figure 7.6. The 
initial state of the system is state 1, therefore it starts with state 1. The probability of 
following any one branch of this tree can be evaluated by multiplying the appropriate 
probabilities of each step of this branch. The calculated branch probabilities can be 
seen in Table 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.6 : Tree diagram of the system [1]. 
Table 7.1 : State probabilities of the example markov model [1] 
  State Probability 
Time Interval State 1 State 2 
1 1/2=0.5 1/2=0.5 
2 3/5=0.375 5/8=0.635 
3 11/32=0.344 21/32=0.656 
 
If the state probabilities are calculated for more time interval and the results are 
represented with a graphic, it will be possible to make some comments about the 
system characteristic. 
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Figure 7.7 : System transient behavior 
The characteristic in the Figure 7.7 [1] are known as the transient behavior or time-
dependent values of the state probabilities. As it can be recognized in the Figure 7.7 
the values of the state probabilities trend to a constant or limiting value. This is 
characteristic of most systems which satisfy the conditions of the Markov approach. 
Following Markov model (Figure 7.8) represents operational behavior of a component 
in a system [40]. State 0 and state 1 are “operating” and “failed” states respectively. 
And the transitions consist of the failure and repair rates. 
 
Figure 7.8 : Markov model of a component [1]. 
Following equations can be defined for the transition probabilities 
 𝑃0(𝑡 + Δ𝑡) = 𝑃0(𝑡)(1 − 𝜆Δ𝑡) + 𝑃1(𝑡) 𝜇Δ𝑡 (7.15) 
 𝑃1(𝑡 + Δ𝑡) = 𝑃1(𝑡)(1 − 𝜇Δ𝑡) + 𝑃0(𝑡) 𝜆Δ𝑡 (7.16) 
Where 
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t : time 
𝜆Δ𝑡 : probability of component failure in finite time interval Δ𝑡 
𝜇Δ𝑡 : probability of component repair in finite time interval Δ𝑡 
𝑃0(𝑡 + Δ𝑡) : probability of component being in operating state 0 at time 𝑡 + Δ𝑡 
𝑃1(𝑡 + Δ𝑡) : probability of component being in failed state 1 at time 𝑡 + Δ𝑡 
1 − 𝜆Δ𝑡 : probability of no failure in finite time interval Δ𝑡 
1 − 𝜇Δ𝑡 : probability of no repair in finite time interval Δ𝑡 
𝑃𝑖 : probability that the component is in the state i at time t, for i=0,1. 
From the equation (7.15)  
 𝑃0(𝑡 + Δ𝑡) = 𝑃0(𝑡) − 𝑃0(𝑡) 𝜆Δ𝑡 + 𝑃1(𝑡) 𝜇Δ𝑡 (7.17) 
Then, 
 lim
Δ𝑡→0
𝑃0(𝑡 + Δ𝑡) − 𝑃0(𝑡)
Δ𝑡
= −𝑃0(𝑡)𝜆 + 𝑃1(𝑡) 𝜇 (7.18) 
Thus, 
 
𝑑𝑃0(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑃0(𝑡) 𝜆 = 𝑃1(𝑡) 𝜇 (7.19) 
 
 
Similarly, from the equation (7.16), 
 
𝑑𝑃1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑃1(𝑡) 𝜇 = 𝑃0(𝑡) 𝜆 (7.20) 
 
at time 𝑡 = 0, 𝑃0(0) = 1 and 𝑃1(0) = 0. 
Laplace transform of these equation, 
 𝑠𝑃0(𝑠) + 𝑃0(𝑠)𝜆 − 𝑃1(𝑠) 𝜇 = 1 (7.21) 
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 𝑠𝑃1(𝑠) + 𝑃1(𝑠) 𝜇 − 𝑃0(𝑠) 𝜆 = 0 (7.22) 
If we rearrange the equation (7.22), 
 𝑃1(𝑠) =
𝜆
𝑠 + 𝜇
𝑃0(𝑠) (7.23) 
Using equation (7.21) and equation (7.23), 
𝑃0(𝑠)(𝑠 + 𝜆) −  𝜇 (
𝜆
𝑠 + 𝜇
𝑃0(𝑠)) = 1 
𝑃0(𝑠) (
(𝑠 + 𝜆) ⋅ (𝑠 + 𝜇) − 𝜇 ⋅ 𝜆
𝑠 + 𝜇
) = 1 
 𝑃0(𝑠) =
𝑠 + 𝜇
(𝑠 + 𝜆) ⋅ (𝑠 + 𝜇) − 𝜇 ⋅ 𝜆
 (7.24) 
 
And using equation (7.23) and equation (7.24), 𝑃1(𝑠) will be, 
 𝑃1(𝑠) =
𝜆
(𝑠 + 𝜆) ⋅ (𝑠 + 𝜇) − 𝜇 ⋅ 𝜆
 (7.25) 
 
Inverse Laplace transform of (7.24) and (7.25), 
 𝑃0(𝑡) =
𝜇
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
+
𝜆
𝜆 + 𝜇
𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡 (7.26) 
 
 𝑃1(𝑡) =
𝜆
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
−
𝜆
𝜆 + 𝜇
𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡 (7.27) 
 
Thus the availability of the system can be defined with equation (7.26) 
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 𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑃0(𝑡) =
𝜇
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
+
𝜆
𝜆 + 𝜇
𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡 (7.28) 
Where 
𝐴(𝑡) : component time-dependent availability 
If it is considered that time is equal to infinity, 
 𝐴 = lim
𝑡→∞
𝐴(𝑡) =
𝜇
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
 (7.29) 
Where 
𝐴 : component steady-state availability 
And the unavailability can be defined similarly, 
 𝑈𝐴 =
𝜆
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
 (7.30) 
Where 
𝑈𝐴 : component steady-state unavailability 
For 𝜇 = 0, from equation (7.26), 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃0(𝑡) = 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡 (7.31) 
Where 
𝑅(𝑡) : component reliability at time t 
If equation (7.31) is integrated over the time interval [0, ∞], following expression can 
be obtained for the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the component: 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = ∫ 𝑒−𝜆𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 
 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
𝜆
 (7.32) 
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For instance, if the failure rate and the repair rate are considered as equal to 0.0003 
failures/hour and 0.0006 repairs/hour, respectively, all parameters of the component 
for 100-hour mission and the steady-state availability can be calculated. 
Reliability of the component:  
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 = 𝑒−0.0003⋅100 = 0.9704 (7.33) 
 
MTTF of the component:  
 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
𝜆
=
1
0.0003
= 3333.3 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 (7.34) 
Availability of the component for 100 hours:  
𝐴(𝑡) =
𝜇
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
+
𝜆
𝜆 + 𝜇
𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡 
𝐴(100) =
0.0006
(0.0003 + 0.0006)
+
0.0003
0.0003 + 0.0006
𝑒−(0.0003+0.0006)⋅100 
 𝐴(100) = 0.9713 (7.35) 
 
Steady-state availability of the component:  
 𝐴 =
𝜇
(𝜆 + 𝜇)
=
0.0006
(0.0003 + 0.0006)
= 0.6667 (7.36) 
 
7.3 Markov Model of Model Station 
In this chapter, a simple Markov model for the model station described in the previous 
chapters has been designed. Furthermore, some RAMS parameters have been obtained 
according to the Markov model. 
Possible failures in railway signalling systems can be categorized by several ways with 
respect to type of the interlocking system. Also, different system states can be 
considered according to the failure types. In this study, two type of failures and four 
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basic states have been considered. Because of the complexity of the model station’s 
layout, component based failures are not considered. The type of the failures are 
explained and the explanation of the states are given in the Table 7.2.  
Tolerable Failure: Tolerable failure is described for the failures which doesn’t block 
the operation of the trains. For instance, a failure in the track detection device can be 
considered as a tolerable failure. If a track detection device gives an occupancy 
information when there is any railway vehicle or any obstacle in the section then the 
signal operator can give the movement authority to the driver by a radio contact or 
special signal aspect defined in the system. 
Significant Failure: This type of failures represent the failures which hinder the 
operation of the trains. For example, point failures can be given as operation-blocking 
failures. Because, trains cannot proceed on a failed point.  
System status can be seen in the following Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 : Definitions of the system states [1]. 
States Explanation 
State 0 System operating normally 
State 1 System has a tolerable failure 
State 1a System operating in degraded mode 
State 2 System has a significant failure 
 
State 0 is defined for the situation of normal operating and system working failure-
free. State 1 represents the system status when there is a tolerable failure in the system. 
When a tolerable failure occurs in the system, the signal operator can confirm this 
failure, if he or she is ensure that this is a tolerable failure, and the system can be 
operated in degraded mode. This condition is represented by State 1a. The last state is 
the significant failure state and the system cannot be operated in this state.  
Figure 7.9 shows the generated Markov model of the model station. Failure rates and 
repair rates are considered as constant values. The mathematical equation of the model 
can be obtained by the expressions given in the “Markov Model” chapter. 
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Table 7.3 : Definitions of the transitions [1]. 
Transitions Explanation 
𝜆0|1 Tolerable failure rate 
𝜆0|2 Significant failure rate 
𝜇1|0 Repair rate of tolerable failure 
𝜇2|0 Repair rate of significant failure 
𝜇1|1𝑎  Transition rate from tolerable failure to degraded mode 
𝜇1𝑎|0 Repair rate of degraded mode 
 
 
Figure 7.9 : Markov model of the model station [1]. 
 
𝑑𝑃0(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
+ (𝜆0|1 + 𝜆0|2) ⋅ 𝑃0(𝑡)
= 𝜇0|1 ⋅ 𝑃1(𝑡) + 𝜇2|0 ⋅ 𝑃2(𝑡) + 𝜇1𝑎|0 ⋅ 𝑃1𝑎(𝑡) 
(7.37) 
 
𝑑𝑃1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
+ (𝜇1|0 + 𝜇1|1𝑎) ⋅ 𝑃1(𝑡) = 𝜆0|1 ⋅ 𝑃0(𝑡) (7.38) 
 
𝑑𝑃2(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
+ (𝜇2|0) ⋅ 𝑃2(𝑡) = 𝜆0|2 ⋅ 𝑃0(𝑡) (7.39) 
 
𝑑𝑃1𝑎(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
+ (𝜇1𝑎|0) ⋅ 𝑃1𝑎(𝑡) = 𝜇1|1𝑎 ⋅ 𝑃1(𝑡) (7.40) 
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At time t=0, 𝑃0(0) = 1, 𝑃1(0) = 0, 𝑃2(0) = 0, 𝑃1𝑎(0) = 0 
If these equations are solved with a calculation tool (e.g Matlab or Mathematica) 
following solutions are obtained for steady-state (𝑡 = ∞) [40] 
𝑃0
=
𝜇1𝑎|0 ⋅ (𝜇2|0) ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0)
(𝜇2|0) ⋅ [𝜇1𝑎|0 ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0) + 𝜆0|1 ⋅ (𝜇1𝑎|0 + 𝜇1|1𝑎)] + 𝜆0|2 ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0) ⋅ (𝜇1𝑎|0)
 
  (7.41) 
 
 𝑃1 =
𝜆0|2
𝜇2|0
⋅ 𝑃0 (7.42) 
 𝑃2 =
𝜆0|1
(𝜇1𝑎|0 + 𝜇1|0)
⋅ 𝑃0 (7.43) 
 𝑃1𝑎 =
𝜆0|1 ⋅ 𝜇1|1𝑎 ⋅ 𝜇2|0
𝜇1𝑎|0 ⋅ (𝜇2|0) ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0)
⋅ 𝑃0 (7.44) 
Hence, the steady-state availability of the system will be 
𝐴 = 𝑃0 
𝐴 = 
𝜇1𝑎|0 ⋅ (𝜇2|0) ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0)
(𝜇2|0) ⋅ [𝜇1𝑎|0 ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0) + 𝜆0|1 ⋅ (𝜇1𝑎|0 + 𝜇1|1𝑎)] + 𝜆0|2 ⋅ (𝜇1|1𝑎 + 𝜇1|0) ⋅ (𝜇1𝑎|0)
 
(7.45) 
 
The reliability of the system, 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃0(𝑡) = 𝑒
−(𝜆0|1+𝜆0|2)⋅𝑡 (7.46) 
 
Lastly, MTTF of the system, 
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𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = ∫ 𝑅(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = ∫ 𝑒−(𝜆0|1+𝜆0|2)⋅𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 
 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
𝜆0|1 + 𝜆0|2
 (7.47) 
 
Using this obtained equation, the parameters of a track detection device can be 
calculated. Following artificial failure and repair rate data are considered. 
𝜆0|1 = 5,15 × 10
−6 1/ℎ 
𝜆0|2 = 1 × 10
−11 1/ℎ 
𝜇1|0 = 0,0833 1/ℎ 
𝜇2|0 = 18000 1/ℎ 
𝜇1|1𝑎 = 18000 1/ℎ 
𝜇1𝑎|0 = 0,5208 1/ℎ 
𝑡 = 5 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 (43800 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠) 
 
𝐴
=
0,5208 ⋅ (18000) ⋅ (18000 + 0,0833)
(18000) ⋅ [0,5208 ⋅ (18000 + 0,0833) + 5,15 × 10−6 ⋅ (0,5208 + 18000)] + 10−11 ⋅ (18000 + 0,0833) ⋅ (0,5208)
 
𝑅(43800) = 𝑒−(5,15×10
−6+1×10−11)⋅43800
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
5,15 × 10−6 + 1 × 10−11
 
Hence, 
 𝐴 ≅ 0,999990111224568 (7.48) 
 𝑅(43800) ≅ 0,798060844658274 (7.49) 
153 
 
 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 ≅ 194174,3802 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 ≅ 22,2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 (7.50) 
 
Following figures shows the effect of the repair rate 𝜇2|0 to the steady-state availability 
with a range starts from 1 to 36000 1/h. 
 
Figure 7.10 : Effect of the repair rate μ2|0 to the steady-state availability [1]. 
As it can be seen in the Figure 7.10, different repair rates affect availability parameter. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Railway interlocking is a safety, financial and environmentally critical system. Any 
failure in it can cause very serious consequences such as loss of human life, severe 
injuries, huge environmental damages or economic penalties. Therefore, railway 
interlocking systems are designed with specific development methods [42]. The usage 
of formal methods in the development of safety critical systems is encouraged. 
Consequently, applying formal methods in this area is an open issue.  
The first main objective of this thesis was to analyze the formal methods in the 
development of a example interlocking mechanism. For that purpose, all basic terms 
and equipment used in railway signalling were defined. Then, the definition of the 
interlocking was given and the functionality of the interlocking in railways was 
explained. A model station was designed with respect to German signalling principles. 
Use of formal methods in the design of railway interlocking is explained. Two widely 
used formal methods, “Petri Nets” and “Finite State Machines” were discussed with 
an example. Furthermore, implementation of designed example model was realized 
with two different software tools. 
As a next step, control mechanisms of basic wayside equipment and other mechanisms 
for route setting function were modelled with FSM. Moreover, generated models were 
implemented with the PLC programming software, SilworX. 
Finally, generated route setting mechanism was tested with the simulator feature of the 
same software. The behavior of the models was the same with expected results. All 
processes of route setting mechanism were monitored step by step. In addition to that 
some failure cases were simulated. The models gave the correct outputs in the failure 
situations.  
The second main objective of this thesis was to make a RAMS analysis for designed 
model station. Basic definitions of RAMS analysis were discussed with reference to 
EN 50126. Then, two mostly used methods which indicated in the same standard were 
examined with detailed examples. Using one of these models, some RAMS parameters 
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were obtained as a final step. Then, these parameters were implemented to an 
equipment with artificial data as an example analysis. A graph was discussed to 
understand the interaction between data and RAMS parameters. 
In modern railway signalling systems, interlocking unit is designed with regard to 
hardware and software redundancy. Hardware redundancy is considered to prevent the 
dangerous consequences of any failure in the hardware of interlocking unit. On the 
other hand, software redundancy is used to protect the system against software failures 
which may occur in the interlocking program. Therefore, diversity of interlocking 
software is recommended to high safety level. 
As a future work, different formal methods can be used to design the same interlocking 
functions to obtain software diversity. Therefore, small modelling failures in design 
steps can be prevented. In addition to that, a voting unit can be designed for the 
interlocking units which based on different formal methods. 
The result outcome of this thesis report is not comparable to a real interlocking system. 
However, the methodology and approach used in this study is based on scientific basis. 
It is only serves an academic purpose. Therefore, the results must be carefully checked 
before any further adoption. 
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